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Delinquent by Reason of Poverty 
Tamar R. Birckhead  
ABSTRACT 
This Article, written for the 12th Annual Access to Equal Justice 
Colloquium, explores the disproportionate representation of low-
income children in the U.S. juvenile justice system. It examines the 
structural and institutional causes of this development, beginning 
with the most common points of entry into delinquency court—the 
child welfare system, public schools, retail stores, and neighborhood 
police presence. It introduces the concept of needs-based 
delinquency, a theory that challenges basic presuppositions about the 
method by which children are adjudicated delinquent. It argues that 
at each stage of the process—from intake through adjudication to 
disposition and probation—the court gives as much or more weight 
to the perceived ―needs‖ of the child and her family than to 
the quality of the evidence against her or the ability of the state to 
prove its case. Typical features of the juvenile code, including the 
procedures for intake and diversion and the use of bench rather than 
jury trials, combine to shift the system‘s emphasis from an evaluation 
of a child‘s criminal responsibility to an assessment of a family‘s 
social service needs. The standard of proof, therefore, is determined 
in large part by the socioeconomic class of the accused rather than 
the nature of the forum, an orientation that lowers the state‘s burden 
for indigent juveniles while heightening it for affluent youth. The 
result is that in all but the most serious of cases, children from low-
income homes do not have to be as ―guilty‖ as those from families of 
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means in order to enter and remain in the system, thereby widening 
the net of court intervention for poor children.  
The Article establishes that the juvenile court‘s traditional focus 
on the needs of destitute youth continues to be reflected in the 
system‘s practices and procedures, despite the modern court‘s shift in 
dispositional philosophy from rehabilitation to youth accountability 
and public safety. It argues that the emphasis on families‘ needs 
when adjudicating delinquency has a disproportionate effect on low-
income children, resulting in high rates of recidivism and perpetuates 
negative stereotypes based on class. It offers strategies for 
confronting and reversing this trend, including data collection that 
records the income-level of juveniles‘ parents; initiatives that raise 
awareness of needs-based delinquency among police, prosecutors, 
defenders, judges, and agency personnel; diversion programs that 
reduce the high rate of juvenile court adjudications for minor 
offenses; cross-agency mental health treatment plans for children 
and adolescents; and the adoption of international juvenile justice 
models that are preventative and diversionary rather than penal and 
punitive. The Article challenges the view that in tight budgetary 
times, court involvement is the only way for poor children to access 
services. It concludes by calling for lawmakers and system players to 
end the practice of needs-based delinquency, with the goal of 
increasing fairness for all youth in the juvenile justice system. 
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Two days before Christmas, an eleven-year-old boy named 
Marcus
1
 entered Macy‘s Department Store in Durham, North 
Carolina. Thirty minutes later, a security officer watched as Marcus 
carried a Macy‘s bag containing a pair of jeans and two Polo shirts 
out of the store; he suspected that the child had not paid for the 
items. The security officer followed Marcus and stopped him on the 
sidewalk. The officer searched him and found a sock in each of his 
front pants pockets, which he believed were also the property of 
Macy‘s. The officer brought Marcus to the back of the store, 
handcuffed and questioned him. He did not offer to contact the 
eleven-year-old boy‘s parents. Marcus quickly admitted to taking the 
merchandise.  
Later, when Marcus‘s uncle arrived to take him home, the security 
officer explained that if the family paid the store $150, then Macy‘s 
would ―settle‖ the claim and would not report the incident to the 
police. However, the uncle, unemployed and in debt, had no savings 
and little cash, and was unable to pay. The security officer warned 
that if Marcus returned to Macy‘s during the next five years, he 
 
 1. This portrait is loosely based on a case adjudicated in juvenile delinquency court in 
Durham, North Carolina, in 2011. All identifying information has been changed. See notes of 
author (Mar. 2, 2011) (on file with author).  
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would be charged with trespass. Marcus was then released. That 
afternoon a Durham County police officer swore out a complaint for 
a juvenile delinquency petition that alleged misdemeanor larceny 
against Marcus and filed it with the juvenile division of the probation 
office.  
Because of the minor nature of the offense and the fact that 
Marcus had no prior delinquency record, the intake probation officer 
who evaluated the case believed that a diversion plan
2
 might be 
appropriate but first, she needed to meet with Marcus and his family. 
In January, she sent a letter to the address that Marcus had given to 
the police, but it was not received. At the end of December, Marcus‘s 
uncle had been unable to pay the rent, so they had moved in with 
friends. Not hearing from the family, the intake officer followed the 
policy of the probation department, which required that complaints 
be filed as delinquency petitions whenever juveniles failed to appear 
for intake.  
The case was scheduled for a hearing in March. In the interim, 
Marcus was located and served with the larceny petition, and counsel 
was appointed to represent him. On the court date, Marcus and his 
uncle, who relied on public transportation, appeared twenty minutes 
late for the morning docket call. Consistent with the practice of her 
office to penalize juveniles who failed to appear on time for court, the 
prosecutor made a note to call the case last. Marcus‘s lawyer, a 
court-appointed solo practitioner, met with him for the first and last 
time in the hallway, explaining only that ―the plea‖ would be quick. 
He gave Marcus a form to sign and returned to the courtroom. 
Marcus, who had no breakfast, waited with his uncle until noon when 
his case was finally called. The judge asked him a series of questions, 
to which Marcus quietly answered ―yes‖ or ―no,‖ depending on 
whether his lawyer was nodding or shaking his head. Without looking 
up, the judge determined that Marcus was entering the admission 
 
 2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-1706(a), (b), (c) (2010) (allowing a juvenile to enter into a 
diversion contract for up to six months with the probation department, in which the juvenile is 
referred to such resources as community service, victim-offender mediation, counseling, and 
teen court, in lieu of filing a delinquency petition); 7B-1706(b) (2010) (allowing the probation 
department to reconsider the decision to divert and authorize the filing of the complaint as a 
petition if at any point during the time period of the contract, the juvenile and her parent or 
guardian fail to comply with the terms of the plan). 
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―knowingly and voluntarily‖ and adjudicated him delinquent. 
Marcus was placed on Level One probation for twelve months with a 
long list of conditions that included the completion of one hundred 
hours of community service, participation in a sixteen-week 
intervention program on ―life skills‖ and ―the promotion of personal 
growth and development,‖ and an evaluation for drug and alcohol 
abuse.  
Ten months later when Marcus‘s case was formally reviewed, the 
judge found him in violation of the terms and conditions of probation 
for having failed to complete his community service hours (he 
completed only fifteen of the one hundred hours ordered) and the 
intervention program (he attended only the first two sessions). 
Marcus‘s lawyer said little during the review hearing, and the child 
was given no opportunity to explain that he could not get to the thrift 
store to do his community service or to the life skills program 
meetings, because his family lacked transportation and he did not 
have money for the city bus. The judge placed Marcus on a second 
year of probation, this time at Level Two, meaning that he was one 
step closer to being removed from his family and placed in a group 
home for delinquent youth or—if he committed more serious 
offenses—a juvenile prison.3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chain of events—from arrest to formal issuance of a juvenile 
petition, to adjudication as a delinquent, to probation supervision—is 
repeated hundreds of thousands of times each year in the juvenile 
delinquency courts of the United States.
4
 In 2008, courts with 
 
 3. State juvenile codes utilize Orwellian terms, such as ―youth development center‖ and 
―training school,‖ to refer to the institutions that house incarcerated juveniles. See, e.g., N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(29) (2010) (defining ―youth development center‖ as a ―secure residential 
facility‖). Most of these facilities, however, have more in common with adult prisons than 
educational or treatment centers. 
 4. Sarah Livsey, Juvenile Delinquency Probation Caseload, 2008, OJJDP FACT SHEET 
1, 1 (Dec. 2011) (finding that in 2008, probation supervision was the most severe disposition in 
34 percent or 556,300 of all delinquency cases), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/ 
236478.pdf. 
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juvenile jurisdiction handled 1.7 million delinquency cases.
5
 More 
than 500,000 of these cases resulted in children being placed on 
probation supervision.
6
 Approximately 80,000 youth were confined 
in juvenile facilities.
7
 Meanwhile, over 300,000 cases (18% of all 
delinquency cases) were dismissed at intake, and an additional 
423,400 cases (25%) were handled informally, with the juvenile 
agreeing to a voluntary sanction, such as community service or 
restitution.
8
 In other words, police officers, civilians, probation 
officers, judges, and lawyers (both prosecutors and defense attorneys) 
make decisions that cumulatively ensure that some children enter and 
remain in the juvenile court system, while others are diverted out of it 
or manage to avoid it completely. Research in the area of 
disproportionate minority contact (DMC) shows that the race and 
ethnicity of the child partially explains this result.
9
 What has not been 
fully analyzed and explored is the critical role of the child‘s 
socioeconomic status, separate and discrete from race and ethnicity.  
Juvenile courts have traditionally been considered the courts of 
the poor and impoverished. While there are, of course, juvenile courts 
located in suburban, middle-class, or wealthier jurisdictions, these 
tend to be the exception rather than the rule.
10
 Although few juvenile 
courts formally keep track of the income-level of a youth‘s family, 
jurisdictions that do so have confirmed that nearly sixty percent were 
either on public assistance or had annual incomes of less than twenty 
 
 5. Crystal Knoll & Melissa Sickmund, Delinquency Cases in Juvenile Court, 2008, 
OJJDP FACT SHEET 1, 1 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/236479.pdf. 
 6. Livsey, supra note 4, at 1. 
 7. Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles in Residential Placement, 1997–2008, OJJDP FACT 
SHEET 1, 1 (Feb. 2010) (defining ―juvenile facilities‖ as including a wide range of housing 
types, including secure and nonsecure; public (state or local), private, and tribal; and long-term 
and short-term). 
 8. Knoll & Sickmund, supra note 5, at 3. 
 9. See, e.g., JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, ADORATION OF THE QUESTION: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (Shadi Rahimi ed., 2008), available at http://burnsinstitute.org/downloads/ 
BI%20Adoration%20of%20the%20Question_2.pdf (―32 of 44 states found evidence of ethnic 
or racial differences in juvenile justice system decision-making that was unaccounted for by 
differential criminal activity.‖).  
 10. See H. Ted Rubin, Impoverished Youth and the Juvenile Court: A Call for Pre-Court 
Diversion, 16 JUV. JUST. UPDATE 2 (Dec.–Jan. 2011). 
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thousand dollars.
11
 Another twenty percent had incomes of less than 
thirty thousand dollars.
12
 Court officials acknowledge that they 
consciously and affirmatively take steps to direct low-income 
families into the juvenile justice system, because they believe that the 
court will ―help the youth and facilitate the services, accountability, 
and discipline‖ needed to become a productive adult.13 Unfortunately, 
as this Article will argue, this common perspective must be 
―reoriented,‖ as such hopes all too often fail to be realized.14  
Empirical data repeatedly confirms that children born into poor 
families suffer a lifetime of negative consequences, and children of 
color are more than twice as likely to be impoverished than their 
white counterparts.
15
 These disparities are seen as early as age two, 
when children of color have been shown to lag behind their white and 
Asian peers on standard child development tests.
16
 Such differences 
become more pronounced as children enter school, with data 
revealing a significant variance in math skills tests at entry into 
kindergarten.
17
 Similar income and racial disparities are also seen in 
regard to quality of health.
18
 For instance, starting at age two, black 
children have ―much higher rates‖ of asthma than white children; 
―higher incidence of asthma leads to higher health costs, [rates of] 
hospitalization, and . . . school [absences], which can continue to 
 
 11. Id. at 1 (discussing the 2008 annual report of the Juvenile Court of Memphis and 
Shelby County, Tennessee). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 2. 
 14. Id. 
 15. TRINA SHANKS ET AL., DIVERGING PATHWAYS: HOW WEALTH SHAPES OPPORTUNITY 
FOR CHILDREN 2 (2011), available at http://insightcced.org/uploads/CRWG/DivergingPath 
ways.pdf; Rubin, supra note 10, at 2 (finding that ―61% of Black children and 62% of Hispanic 
children in [the U.S.] live in low-income families, compared to 27% of white children‖). 
 16. SHANKS ET AL., supra note 15, at 6 (―Child development skills include acquisition of 
object constancy; memory learning and problem solving; vocalization and beginning of verbal 
communication; basis of abstract thinking; mental mapping; complex language; and 
mathematical concept formation.‖). 
 17. Id. at 6–7; see also Rubin, supra note 10, at 6 (finding that ―80% of children of 
parents who [lack] a high-school degree live in poverty, as do 60% of children of parents with 
only a high school degree‖). 
 18. Rubin, supra note 10, at 6 (―Children living in poverty often experience numerous 
physical and mental health problems along with difficulty accessing immediate and appropriate 
health care interventions.‖). 
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have enduring consequences, especially if the condition is not well-
managed.‖19  
Given that the population of African-American, Latino, Asian, 
Native American, and Pacific Islander youth is expected to 
―collectively outpace‖ the number of Caucasian children in the 
United States by 2024,
20
 the population of children living in poverty 
will continue to expand,
21
 and—as this Article shows—the number of 
low-income youth channeled into the juvenile and criminal justice 
systems will correspondingly grow. Although the current economic 
downturn provides fodder for arguing that court involvement is the 
most efficient way for poor children and their families to access 
needed services, this is a cycle of disadvantage that must be broken, 
as it will perpetuate a permanent underclass.
 
 
This Article, written for the 12th Annual Access to Equal Justice 
Colloquium, seeks to address the gap in legal scholarship in this area 
by exploring the disproportionate representation of low-income 
children in the U.S. juvenile justice system. Part II establishes that the 
traditional juvenile court‘s focus was on the needs of destitute youth, 
a focus that continues to be reflected in the modern system‘s 
practices and procedures, despite the shift in the court‘s dispositional 
philosophy from the rehabilitative ideal to one of retribution. Part III 
 
 19. SHANKS ET AL., supra note 15, at 7. 
 20. Janell Ross, Minority Children Four Times More Likely to Start Poor, Stay Poor, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 7, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/06/minority-children 
-start-poor-stay-poor_n_845866.html.  
 21. See MARYBETH J. MATTINGLY ET AL., ONE MILLION ADDITIONAL CHILDREN IN 
POVERTY SINCE 2009: 2010 DATA REVEAL NEARLY ONE IN FOUR SOUTHERN CHILDREN NOW 
LIVE IN POVERTY 1 (2011) (―Between 2009 and 2010 an additional one million children joined 
the ranks of those in poverty. This brings the total to an estimated 15.7 poor children in 2010, 
an increase of 2.6 million since the Great Recession began in 2007.‖), available at http://www. 
carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/IB-Bean-Same-Day-Poverty.pdf; Jillian Berman, One in 
Four Young U.S. Children Living in Poverty, Study Finds, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/22/children-in-poverty-us_n_976868.html?view=screen 
(stating that child poverty in the U.S. has been growing over the past decade, and quoting the 
report: ―children who are poor before age six have been shown to experience educational 
deficits, and health problems, with effects that span the life course‖); Sabrina Tavernise, 2010 
Data Show Surge in Poor Young Families, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011 (finding that ―more than 
one in three young families with children were living in poverty [in 2010]‖); Sabrina Tavernise, 
Soaring Poverty Casts Spotlight on ‗Lost Decade,‘ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011 (―Poverty has 
swallowed more children, with about 16.4 million in its ranks last year, the highest numbers 
since 1962 . . . That means 22 percent of children are in poverty, the highest percentage since 
1993.‖). 
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examines the structural and institutional causes of this development, 
beginning with the most common points of entry into juvenile 
delinquency court—the child welfare system, public schools, retail 
stores, and neighborhood police presence. It introduces the concept of 
needs-based delinquency, analyzing the juvenile code provisions and 
court practices that sustain it and the individual perceptions and 
biases of system actors that perpetuate it. Challenging basic 
presuppositions about the way in which children are adjudicated 
delinquent in the United States, the Article argues that at each stage 
of the process, the court often gives as much or more weight to the 
perceived ―needs‖ of the child than to the strength of the evidence 
against her. It demonstrates that in all but the most serious of cases, 
the standard of proof applied depends more upon the social service 
requirements of the juvenile‘s family than the nature of the forum. 
Part IV argues that juvenile courts‘ resulting orientation negatively 
impacts youth and ultimately increases the risk of recidivism. 
Children from low-income homes do not have to be as ―guilty‖ as 
those from families of means to enter and remain in the juvenile 
system, effectively widening the net of court intervention for the 
poor. Part V suggests strategies for confronting and reversing this 
trend, while acknowledging the challenges that are likely to be 
encountered.  
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN JUVENILE COURT 
The modern juvenile court, in which the socioeconomic status of 
the child serves as a thumb on the scale at each stage of the 
adjudicatory process, is a product of its history. In order to appreciate 
how and why the juvenile court continues to adjudicate a 
disproportionate number of poor children delinquent, it is crucial to 
examine the court‘s development.  
A. The Traditional Court 
The founders of the juvenile court were part of a nineteenth 
century humanitarian movement that helped elevate the status of 
children from that of property to a dependent class in need of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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protection by the state.
22
 In 1825, reformers established the New 
York House of Refuge, which provided food, shelter, and education 
to homeless and impoverished youth, many of whom were children 
of recent immigrants.
23
 They made few distinctions between children 
who were paupers and those who committed minor crimes.
24
 Instead, 
their objective was to identify those who were still ―innocent,‖ to 
remove them from the corrupting influence of ―mature criminals,‖ 
and to impose appropriate ―atonement and punishment.‖25 For those 
within the House of Refuge movement, poverty and crime were 
virtually synonymous: ―Unattended pauperism was thought to ripen 
into criminality, and uncontrolled criminality—particularly vagrancy, 
beggary and minor thefts—swelled the ranks of paupers who had to 
be supported in public institutions.‖26 The reformers of this era 
conceived of both of these conditions in moral terms.
27
 
Philanthropists as well as public officials believed that immorality 
caused poverty and that the poor, by virtue of their socioeconomic 
status, posed a threat to lawful society.
28
 
In the early 1880s, Florence Kelley, a college undergraduate who 
became an internationally-known child welfare expert based in 
Chicago, wrote her thesis on the child‘s changing legal status.29 
Citing recently-drafted legislation explicitly designed to protect 
children, she declared that the child was becoming an individual in 
the eyes of the law, separate and discrete from his or her role in the 
 
 22. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: 
Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 46 
(Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).  
 23. Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 
1187, 1187, 1201–02 (1970) (finding that in the first year of the House, 41 percent of the youth 
were offspring of immigrants, and by the fourth year it was 58 percent). 
 24. Id. at 1192–93 (quoting a noted English penal reformer as stating that all children 
under fourteen ―may be classed together . . . for there is no distinction between pauper, vagrant, 
and criminal children, which would require a different system of treatment‖). 
 25. Id. at 1189–92, 1194. 
 26. Id. at 1199. 
 27. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT 53 (1999) (citing STEVEN SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ―PROGRESSIVE‖ JUVENILE JUSTICE 17 (1977)); Fox, supra note 23, 
at 1199. 
 28. Fox, supra note 23, at 1199–1200. 
 29. Tanenhaus, supra note 22, at 46 (citing Florence Kelley, On Some Changes in the 
Legal Status of the Child Since Blackstone, INT‘L REV. 7, 13 (1882)). 
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family.
30
 In this way, Kelley and other reformers believed they had 
both a ―legal opening as well as the social responsibility‖ to carry 
forward the doctrine of parens patriae, in which the state serves as a 
surrogate parent to the child when the family fails to meet its 
obligations.
31
 By the early 1890s, developments in nineteenth century 
corrections systems helped further this notion. The reform school 
movement utilized innovations that later formed the basis for the 
juvenile court, including an age-based distinction between juvenile 
and adult offenders, indeterminate commitments, and a broadened 
legal authority that encompassed children convicted of crimes as well 
as those adjudicated neglected and incorrigible.
32
 In addition, the 
Massachusetts probation system required criminal courts to appoint 
probation officers in juvenile cases and provided for the placement of 
children in foster homes.
33
  
The first juvenile court was established in 1899 in Chicago 
through the work of Lucy Flower, a philanthropist; Julia Lathrop, a 
child-welfare expert;
34
 and Jane Addams, the founder of the 
pioneering settlement, Hull House, where college-educated men and 
women who sought to work with the poor could live.
35
 Flower, who 
herself had been orphaned as a child, married a prominent attorney 
and served on the boards of several of Chicago‘s charitable 
institutions, including orphan asylums.
36
 Distressed by the punitive 
treatment of young offenders who were tried and incarcerated 
alongside their adult counterparts, and by the increasing inability of 
working families to supervise their children, she called for the 
creation of a ―parental court‖ to hear the cases of dependent and 
delinquent children under sixteen.
37
 Addams, too, through her 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. The Latin term parens patriae translates literally as ―parent of his or her country.‖ 
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). 
 32. FELD, supra note 27, at 51. 
 33. Tanenhaus, supra note 22, at 47; see also 2 GRACE ABBOTT, THE CHILD AND THE 
STATE 330 (1938). 
 34. Tanenhaus, supra note 22, at 42. 
 35. CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 26 (1998); 
see also JANE ADDAMS, TWENTY YEARS AT HULL-HOUSE WITH AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
129–53 (1945). 
 36. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 4–5 (2004). 
 37. See id. at 4. 
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observations of children living in the neighborhood served by Hull 
House, became convinced that ―society‘s existing response to crime 
was virtually irrelevant to the vast majority of offenders, who were 
young.‖38 Through their benevolent work, Flower and Addams each 
formed a bond with Lathrop, a social worker who herself lived at 
Hull House,
39
 which had become an impromptu kindergarten, 
infirmary, meeting place, night school, and arts and social center for 
the city‘s impoverished West Side.40  
The ―moral crusade‖ that these women spearheaded on behalf of 
indigent children took more than a decade and culminated in the 
world‘s first juvenile court act.41 The law represented the merging of 
concerns about poverty and child welfare with those regarding crime 
control and high recidivism rates.
42
 As David S. Tanenhaus has 
written, Chicago‘s juvenile court movement constituted ―a local 
manifestation of a transatlantic social movement in the 1880s and 
1890s to solve the problems of crime and poverty, which were often 
conceived of and discussed in similar terms.‖43 Reformers of this 
period focused on the ―environmental causes‖ of delinquency, 
deemphasizing the specific misconduct of the child in favor of 
evaluating the broader needs—social, physical, and educational—of 
the family.
44
 Children who violated the law were not to be regarded 
as criminals but as wards of the state who should receive nearly the 
same ―care, custody, and discipline‖ as that given to neglected and 
dependent children.
45
 The Illinois law served as the model for most of 
the other states and for nations in Europe, South America, and Asia.
46
 
By 1925, all but two states had a juvenile court, and there was one 
operating in every city with a population greater than one hundred 
thousand.
47
  
 
 38. MANFREDI, supra note 35, at 26. 
 39. Id. at 25–26; see also TANENHAUS, supra note 36, at 4–5. 
 40. See MARGARET TIMS, JANE ADDAMS OF HULL HOUSE: 1860–1935, at 49–52 (1961). 
 41. TANENHAUS, supra note 36, at 4. 
 42. Id. at 4–5. 
 43. Id. at 5. 
 44. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205–07, 210 (1980). 
 45. HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (1927). 
 46. TANENHAUS, supra note 36, at 4.  
 47. Tanenhaus, supra note 22, at 45. 
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For its first fifty or sixty years, juvenile court jurisdiction was 
broad and extended over all types of conduct by and circumstances 
affecting children. The law did not differentiate among children who 
were dependent, neglected, or delinquent, for in many instances a 
child could be placed in more than one of these categories.
48
 Instead, 
a ―delinquent child‖ was generally defined as ―incorrigible,‖ 
―growing up in idleness or crime,‖ or ―whose conduct and 
environment seems to point to a criminal career.‖49 A few states did 
not determine jurisdiction based on the status of the child but instead 
enumerated the specific conditions under which a child could be 
brought into juvenile court, including conditions typically covered by 
the definitions of dependency, neglect, delinquency, and ―mental 
defect.‖50 The child would then be adjudicated ―as a ward of the 
juvenile court in need of care and protection rather than as a 
delinquent or a dependent child.‖51 
As early as the 1920s, there were serious critics of the juvenile 
court. For instance, in 1927, Herbert Lou acknowledged the dangers 
inherent in the virtually unfettered discretion wielded by juvenile 
court judges, writing that ―[t]he ‗blanket‘ provisions of the statutes, if 
unwisely construed, would give to the juvenile courts so wide and 
such arbitrary powers that, compared to them, as Dean Pound has 
said, ‗the powers of the court of Star Chamber were a bagatelle.‘‖52 
In 1949, Paul Tappan questioned the juvenile court movement‘s 
interpretation and use of the concept of parens patriae, emphasizing 
the importance of ―sav[ing] the child from his saviors.‖53 Tappan 
contended that the doctrine neither required nor justified the 
procedural informality that characterized most juvenile courts.
54
 He 
called for an end to traditional practices that violated the presumption 
 
 48. LOU, supra note 45, at 52; see also Fox, supra note 23, at 1193.  
 49. See, e.g., Illinois Revised Statutes, ch. 23 ILL. COMP. STAT.; § 169 (1907); see also 
LOU, supra note 45, at 65.  
 50. LOU, supra note 45, at 53 (citing the Laws of California, 1915, ch. 631). 
 51. Id. 
 52. LOU, supra note 45, at 68 (citations omitted). 
 53. PAUL TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 208 (1949); see also MANFREDI, supra note 
35, at 37.  
 54. TAPPAN, supra note 53, at 204–07 (―Children are adjudicated in this way every day 
without visible manifestations of due process. They are incarcerated. They become adult 
criminals, too, in thankless disregard of the state‘s good intentions as parens patriae.‖). 
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of innocence, such as the dissemination of probation reports prior to 
adjudication;
55
 and he suggested practical reforms that included 
limiting juvenile court‘s jurisdiction, employing more consistent 
adjudicative procedures, and imposing fewer institutional 
commitments at disposition.
56
 Growing critiques of traditional 
juvenile court practices culminated in a ―comprehensive and 
influential‖ study published in 1966 in the Harvard Law Review, 
which relied on empirical evidence to conclude that the role of law 
enforcement agencies in the juvenile court system had expanded far 
beyond their discretionary arrest powers;
57
 that judges in effect 
discouraged juveniles from retaining counsel, such that attorneys 
appeared on behalf of juveniles in only five percent of cases;
58
 and 
that some judges reflexively imposed punitive incarceration at 
disposition.
59
 In short, the survey of juvenile court practices ―offered 
additional evidence that the rehabilitative ideal was either 
fundamentally flawed or imperfectly implemented.‖60 Such 
scholarship set the stage for the 1967 Supreme Court decision, In re 
Gault.
61
  
B. The Worst of Both Worlds 
In mandating that juveniles have basic Constitutional rights, 
including the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, 
and the right to cross-examine witnesses,
62
 the landmark case of In re 
Gault called for ―radical changes‖ to be made in delinquency courts 
 
 55. Id. at 212–15. 
 56. Id. at 209–12, 254–55, 264–74. 
 57. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 775, 776–87 (1966) (discussing the wide discretion given to police during the 
screening process, the fact that the majority of juvenile cases are referred to the court by the 
police, and that half of all police contacts with youth are settled informally without court 
referral).  
 58. Id. at 796–99. 
 59. Id. at 807–08, 810 (―Where institutional facilities are not truly therapeutic but simply 
a penal institution separate from that provided for ‗hardened‘ adult criminals, they should not be 
available as a dispositional alternative to the juvenile court judge; if the security needs of 
society demand confinement, the juvenile‘s case should be waived to an ordinary court for 
trial.‖); see also MANFREDI, supra note 35, at 40–42. 
 60. MANFREDI, supra note 35, at 41. 
 61. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 62. Id. at 57. 
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across the United States.
63
 The decision represented a recognition by 
the Court that juveniles were being summarily adjudicated delinquent 
and sentenced to long terms of incarceration without the benefit of 
either due process protections on the front end or effective 
rehabilitative services on the back end, creating a forum in which 
youth were receiving ―the worst of both worlds.‖64 Given that the 
Harvard Law Review‘s juvenile court study was cited by the Gault 
majority numerous times,
65
 it is not implausible to suggest that the 
Court‘s decision was—in some important respects—a direct response 
to the legal community‘s increasingly vocal critiques.66  
Gault also paved the way for a critical reinterpretation of 
traditional juvenile court history. In 1969 and 1970, prominent 
scholars argued that the founders intended for the procedural 
informality of the court to serve not as a means for providing 
treatment and services but as a method of social control.
67
 These 
revisionists challenged Gault‘s characterization of the juvenile court 
as a benevolent institution, which was created to ―save‖ wayward 
youth and merely missed the mark.
68
 They asserted that the standards 
set by the court for ―family propriety‖ were so high that few parents 
could meet them, but that ―only lower-class families were evaluated 
as to their competence, whereas the propriety of middle-class families 
was exempt from investigation and recrimination.‖69 From this 
perspective, the juvenile court was—from the outset—an instrument 
 
 63. Fred P. Graham, High Court Rules Adult Code Holds in Juvenile Trials, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 16, 1967, at A1. 
 64. See FELD, supra note 27, at 162; see also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555–56 
(stating that because juvenile court proceedings are neither wholly civil nor criminal in nature, a 
juvenile ―gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative 
treatment postulated for children‖). 
 65. See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 11 n.7, 13 n.11, 15 n.14, 18 n.23, 24 n.31.  
 66. MANFREDI, supra note 35, at 42. 
 67. See, e.g., ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF 
DELINQUENCY 126, 134–36, 176–81 (Rutgers U. Press 2d ed. 2009) (1969) (stating that the 
juvenile court movement depicted ―delinquents‖ as ―needing firm control and restraint if their 
reform was to be successful‖ and that the founders of the court were motivated by an 
authoritarian impulse, which called for imprisonment to remove delinquents from ―corrupting 
influences‖); Fox, supra note 23, at 1229–30; see also FELD, supra note 27, at 55–56. 
 68. See PLATT, supra note 67, at 134–36, 176–81 (―The ‗invention‘ of delinquency 
consolidated the inferior social status and dependency of lower-class youth.‖); Fox, supra note 
23, at 1229–30; see also Gault, 387 U.S. at 21, 22; MANFREDI, supra note 35, at 43. 
 69. PLATT, supra note 67, at 135. 
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of ―social coercion‖ designed to dominate the urban poor, perpetuate 
existing class structures, and routinize state control over children‘s 
behavior.
70
  
Despite Gault‘s introduction of basic due process rights and 
procedures into the juvenile court model, the decision has its critics.
71
 
Through the 1980s and 90s, the argument that juveniles received the 
―worst of both worlds‖ continued to resonate, as ever greater 
numbers of young offenders were tried as adults and as the punitive 
ethos eclipsed the rehabilitative ideal.
72
 In recent years, Emily Buss 
has argued that by modeling juvenile court solely on adult criminal 
court, Gault missed the opportunity to fashion an adjudicative system 
that responded to the very specific needs and developmental posture 
of youth.
73
 Barry Feld has suggested that Gault, as well as other 
Supreme Court decisions that extended procedural protections to 
juveniles, failed to take into account whether young offenders are, in 
fact, developmentally capable of exercising rights such as the 
privilege against self-incrimination.
74
 The social science research of 
Feld and others indicates that contrary to Gault, juveniles require 
 
 70. See id. at 134–40, 176–81; see also Fox, supra note 23, at 122–30; FELD, supra note 
27, at 56. 
 71. See, e.g., PLATT, supra note 67, at 174–75 (―The Gault decision will not in itself 
enhance the bargaining power or autonomy of young offenders. The participation of lawyers in 
juvenile court is likely to make the system more efficient and orderly, but not substantially 
more fair or benevolent.‖). 
 72. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Childhood, in A CENTURY OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 113, 132–33 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (―Responding to an 
increase in violent juvenile crime (particularly homicide) in the 1980s and 1990s, reformers 
advocate policies under which juveniles (at least those who commit serious crimes) are tried in 
adult courts and sentenced in adult prisons. The goals of modern criminal justice reform are 
public protection and punishment, and in service of these goals, reform rhetoric has obliterated 
any distinctions between youthful offenders and adults.‖). 
 73. Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 41–43 (2003) 
(―In failing to consider what procedural adaptations were demanded by the special context of 
juvenile court, Gault reduced the analysis of children‘s due process rights to the simple-minded 
question of adult rights or no rights. And in the many states considering accused juveniles‘ due 
process rights since Gault, the Court has adhered to this narrow and nonsensical framing.‖). 
 74. FELD, supra note 27, at 162–63; see also Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of 
Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 BUFFALO L. REV. 1447, 1479–83 (2009) (discussing social 
science research suggesting that when juveniles perceive that they have been treated fairly by 
police and the courts, a judgment shown not to be dependent upon the outcome of the case, they 
are less likely to recidivate). But see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. __ (2011) (holding that 
a juvenile‘s youth may be a factor in determining whether a suspect was in custody, such that 
Miranda warnings should have been given). 
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more—not the same or fewer—procedural safeguards than adults in 
order to ―achieve procedural equality and to enable them to exercise 
those rights they theoretically possess.‖75 Further, state assessments 
of access to counsel and quality of representation in delinquency 
proceedings, coordinated by the National Juvenile Defender Center, 
revealed that many juvenile court judges persist in focusing on the 
needs of the youth without first objectively determining whether a 
criminal offense has even been committed.
76
 These empirical studies 
have confirmed that judges, prosecutors, police officers, and lawyers 
continue to adhere to the notion that the juvenile court requires 
complete procedural informality and wide judicial discretion to 
function.
77
 Moreover, the assumption and belief that delinquency 
 
 75. FELD, supra note 27, at 163; see, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The 
Problem of False Confession in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 945 (2004) 
(showing that out of 125 proven false confessions, 62 percent were under the age of 25 and 35 
percent were under 18); Barry C. Feld, Juveniles‘ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An 
Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26 (2006) (analyzing quantitative and 
qualitative data that questions adolescents‘ adjudicative competence and their capacity to 
exercise or waive Miranda rights); Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An 
Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219 (2006) (analyzing 
data on police interrogations of juveniles who waived their Miranda rights, and arguing that 
such interrogations be recorded in their entirety, that the length of the interrogation be limited, 
and that the use of deceit and false evidence to elicit confessions be prohibited); Thomas Grisso 
et al., Juveniles‘ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents and Adults‘ 
Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 356–57 (2003) (noting that 
children 15 years of age or younger are more likely than older teens to comply with authority 
and confess to an offense); see also Allison Redlich, The Susceptibility of Juveniles to False 
Confessions and False Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 952 (2010) (finding that police 
officers routinely interrogate juveniles using the same tactics that they use on adult suspects).  
 76. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. CALVIN ET AL., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., 
WASHINGTON: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION 
IN JUVENILE OFFENDER MATTERS 23–24 (2003) [hereinafter WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT], 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/wareport.pdf (noting that some juvenile court judges have personal 
biases in favor of a parens patriae or surrogate parent approach to young offenders, making it 
difficult for them to maintain objectivity as neutral fact-finders during adjudication); see also 
Tamar R. Birckhead, Culture Clash: The Challenge of Lawyering Across Difference in Juvenile 
Court, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 959, 970–79 (2010) (describing the ways in which the attitudes and 
decisions of each of the principal players in the juvenile courtroom combine to undermine the 
duty to provide juveniles with zealous, client-centered representation).  
 77. See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GEORGIA: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 24 (2001), http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf (―Overall, there is a general 
sense of futility among defense attorneys about preparing juvenile cases for adjudication 
because courts are less interested in inquiring into the guilt or innocence of a child, and more 
intent on dispensing treatment or punishment to the child.‖); TEXAS APPLESEED FAIR DEF. 
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court is the ideal vehicle for indigent children to receive social 
services still persists, nearly forty-five years after Gault.
78
 Part III 
examines the causes of this development. 
III. DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION OF LOW-INCOME 
CHILDREN: STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CAUSES  
Although the concept of needs-based delinquency is rooted in the 
early history of juvenile court, the phenomenon continues to be 
perpetuated through the structure and culture of the modern juvenile 
court. In order to illustrate the ways in which both law and practice 
privilege consideration of juveniles‘ needs over the weight of the 
evidence against them, this Part examines the system‘s most common 
points of entry, its governing laws and policies, and the attitudes and 
assumptions of those who operate within it.  
A. Points of Entry  
1. Child Welfare System 
Adolescents who are exposed to traumatic events, including those 
who are victims of abuse, neglect, or other maltreatment, cross over 
from the child welfare to the juvenile delinquency system at high 
percentages.
79
 Studies indicate that youth in out-of-home placement 
 
PROJECT ON INDIGENT DEF. PRACTICE IN TEX.—JUVENILE CHAPTER, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: 
JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 16–17 (2000) [hereinafter TEXAS ASSESSMENT], http:// 
www.njdc.info/pdf/TexasAssess.pdf (finding that defense attorneys have little, if any, contact 
with prosecutors prior to court hearings, all such hearings are informal, and motions for 
discovery are uncommon); Birckhead, supra note 76, at 970–79.  
 78. See, e.g., ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT‘L JUV. DEFENDER CTR., ROLE OF JUVENILE 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DELINQUENCY COURT 5 (2009), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ 
njdc_role_of_counsel_book.pdf (―[I]n some jurisdictions, because they view juvenile court first 
and foremost as an opportunity to ‗help a child,‘ judges and other system participants 
undermine attorneys‘ efforts to challenge the government‘s evidence and provide zealous, 
client-centered representation, considering such advocacy an impediment to the smooth 
function of the court.‖); see also Birckhead, supra note 76, at 970 (quoting a juvenile court 
judge in North Carolina as stating, ―We don‘t pay much attention to the fact-portion of the case. 
We just want to get these kids help.‖). 
 79. FED. ADVISORY COMM. JUV. JUST., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 3–4 (Nov. 2010), 
available at http://www.facjj.org/annualreports/00-FACJJ%20Annual%20Report-FINAL%205 
08.pdf; SHAY BILCHIK & MICHAEL NASH, CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: TWO SIDES 
OF THE SAME COIN, JUV. & FAMILY JUST. TODAY 16, 17 (Fall 2008), available at http://cjjr 
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and group homes for purposes of foster care, mental health treatment, 
or drug and alcohol addiction are twice as likely to commit 
delinquent acts as youth who receive in-home or community-based 
services.
80
 Crossover youth are also twice as likely as juvenile 
justice-only youth to recidivate.
81
 Research has shown that although 
children of color are not at greater risk of being neglected or abused, 
they are more likely to be placed in foster care, remain there longer, 
and receive fewer services than white children, and they are less 
likely to be reunited with their families of origin.
82
 Children of color 
in the child welfare system are twice as likely to be arrested as are 
similarly-situated white children.
83
  
Similarly, young people who enter the juvenile justice system as 
―status offenders,‖84 as a result of having been adjudicated as 
runaways, truants, or ―incorrigible,‖85 also crossover into delinquency 
court at high percentages.
86
 Often this happens seamlessly: a child 
who is already under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a result 
of not attending school, for instance, is more likely to be charged 
with a delinquent act, such as disorderly conduct at school, than a 
child who is not already in the system. Because of state and federal 
 
.georgetown.edu/pdfs/Fall%2008%20NCJFCJ%20Today%20feature.pdf. Children known to 
both the child welfare and juvenile justice system are also referred to as ―crossover youth,‖ 
―dual-jurisdiction cases,‖ ―cross-system cases,‖ and ―dually adjudicated youth.‖ FED. 
ADVISORY COMM. JUV. JUST., supra, at 3. 
 80. FED. ADVISORY COMM. JUV. JUST., supra note 79, at 4. 
 81. Bilchik & Nash, supra note 79, at 19. 
 82. FED. ADVISORY COMM. JUV. JUST., supra note 79, at 4. 
 83. Bilchik & Nash, supra note 79, at 17. 
 84. ―The 2011 Code of Federal Regulations for the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act (JJDPA) defines ‗status‘ offenders‖ as: a juvenile offender who has been 
charged with or adjudicated for conduct which would not, under the law of the jurisdiction in 
which the offense was committed, be a crime if committed by an adult.‖ See Linda A. 
Szymanski, What is the Valid Court Order Exception to Secure Detention for Status 
Offenders?, NCJJ SNAPSHOT 1, 1 (May 2011), available at http://new.ncjj.org/pdf/Snapshots/ 
2011/vol16_no5_What%20is%20the%20Valid%20Court%20Order%20Exception%20to%20 
Secure%20Detention%20for%20Status%20Offenders.pdf. 
 85. See HANNAH BENTON ET AL., REPRESENTING JUVENILE STATUS OFFENDERS 23–24 
(2010) (stating that behaviors in this category range from a child physically abusing a parent to 
consistently violating a curfew to repeated verbal fighting among family members). 
 86. See id. at 130 (stating that ―parents often attempt to deal with family conflicts or 
adolescent mental illness or substance abuse by urging that their child be charged with a 
crime‖). 
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statutory limits on the length of commitments
87
 as well as post-
detention safeguards for status offenders,
88
 juvenile court judges and 
probation officers have added incentives to pursue the filing of 
delinquency petitions against ―undisciplined‖ youth.89 In fact, 
anecdotal evidence reveals instances in which judges and other court 
officials have explicitly urged parents of status offenders to file 
delinquency petitions against their children for minor crimes so that 
the court could provide a wider range of services and impose more 
punitive sanctions.
90
  
Despite the fact that crossover youth frequently move back and 
forth between child welfare and delinquency court, there has been 
little ―integration and coordination‖ between the two systems.91 Child 
welfare agencies often close the files of children who become 
involved in the juvenile justice system; the two systems do not share 
data; and there is no continuity of care in the form of staff, 
 
 87. See, e.g., id. at 2 (stating that federal regulations ―prohibit detention [of status 
offenders] beyond a limited time period before and after an initial court appearance‖); 
Szymanski, supra note 84, at 1 (finding that currently sixteen states prohibit secure detention 
for all status offenders, including those who have violated court orders). 
 88. See BENTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 2 (discussing the requirements under the JJDPA 
that a status offender be interviewed within 24 hours of being detained by someone who is not a 
part of the court or law enforcement agency, that the interviewer submit a report to the court 
that assesses whether less-restrictive settings had been considered, and that the court release the 
youth from detention pending a violation hearing unless it was shown that continued detention 
was necessary for protective purposes or to assure the juvenile‘s appearance in court). 
 89. Compare Szymanski, supra note 84, at 1 (stating that to be eligible for federal funding 
under the JJDPA, states are only allowed to hold status offenders in secure detention for 
violations of a valid court order but are otherwise required to remove them from detention and 
provide prevention, diversion, and treatment services), with Andrea J. Sedlak & Carol Bruce, 
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Youth‘s Characteristics and 
Backgrounds: Findings from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement, JUV. JUST. BULL. 1, 
2 (Dec. 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227730.pdf (finding that in 2003, more 
than one hundred thousand youth ages ten through twenty were in residential placement in the 
U.S. because they were arrested for, charged with, or adjudicated for an offense).  
 90. See, e.g., BENTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 130 (stating that parents are told that 
―status offense proceedings lack substantial service options for youth‖ and that ―the only way to 
access . . . services is through the delinquency system‖); see notes of author (Sept. 7, 2005) (on 
file with author). 
 91. FED. ADVISORY COMM. JUV. JUST., supra note 79, at 3. But see, e.g., E-mail from 
Marcia Morey, Chief District Court Judge Durham County, N.C., to author (Sept. 20, 2011) (on 
file with author) (describing the recently-established dual-jurisdiction court in Durham for 
children in both the child welfare and delinquency systems, and stating that ―[w]e are trying to 
bridge the two systems to have a common order, plan and purpose‖).  
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caseworkers, or treatment providers.
92
 Data shows that many 
crossover children are racial and ethnic minorities, female, and have 
mental health and substance abuse problems that are left untreated by 
both systems.
93
 Further, crossover girls are more likely to become 
pregnant than juvenile justice-only females.
94
 Once adolescents age 
out of the child welfare system or are discharged by juvenile 
delinquency court, agencies and insurers typically discontinue their 
access to services.
95
 All of these factors place crossover youth at 
greater risk of reoffending.
96
  
Furthermore, research indicates that child protective service 
agencies (CPS) serve low-income and indigent families at higher 
percentages than families of means.
97
 Data also shows that poverty, 
especially in combination with parental depression, substance abuse, 
and social isolation, is strongly associated with child maltreatment, 
particularly neglect.
98
 There are a number of theories for these 
correlations, including the suggestion that unemployment and 
underemployment create significant stress within families, which in 
turn, leads to higher rates of maltreatment in these households.
99
 
Other studies demonstrate that rates of child abuse and neglect are, in 
fact, similar across socioeconomic lines but that suspected child 
maltreatment in low-income families is reported more frequently to 
CPS because the poor have ―more contact with and are under greater 
scrutiny‖ from individuals who are legally mandated reporters.100 
 
 92. FED. ADVISORY COMM. JUV. JUST., supra note 79, at 3–4. 
 93. Id.; Bilchik & Nash, supra note 79, at 17–18. 
 94. Bilchik & Nash, supra note 79, at 18. 
 95. See FEDERAL ADVISORY COMM. JUV. JUSTICE, supra note 79, at 4. 
 96. Id. at 4. 
 97. See JILL GOLDMAN ET AL., A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT: THE FOUNDATION FOR PRACTICE 33 (2003), available at http://www.childwelfare 
.gov/pubs/usermanuals/foundation/foundation.pdf (―In 1999, 85 percent of States identified 
poverty and substance abuse as the top two problems challenging families reported to child 
protective service (CPS) agencies.‖); Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality 
Movement in Child Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 
898–99 (2009). 
 98. GOLDMAN ET AL., supra note 97, at 33. 
 99. Id.  
 100. See, e.g., id. at 33–34 (citing Rod Plotnik, Economic Security for Families with 
Children, in THE CHILD WELFARE CHALLENGE: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH 95, 103–04 
(P.J. Pecora et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000)). But see Bartholet, supra note 97, at 910–20 (debunking 
this claim). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:53 
 
 
Likewise, families whose children have been adjudicated for status 
offenses are also frequently indigent,
101
 as parents may turn to the 
court because they lack the resources to secure private assistance for 
their children who have run away, stopped attending school, or are 
―ungovernable.‖102 As a result, both the child welfare and status 
offender systems are common points of entry into delinquency court, 
illustrating that juvenile court continues to make few meaningful 
distinctions between poor and guilty children. 
2. Public Schools 
Children in indigent families are more likely to attend low quality 
schools, perform poorly on standardized tests, and complete fewer 
years of formal education.
103
 Low-income children are less likely to 
have parents who can serve as effective advocates for them, ensure 
that their educational needs are met, and provide appropriate 
supervision and support for them outside of school hours.
104
 
Moreover, school administrators often fail to identify poor and 
minority children as having special education needs and impose 
punitive sanctions for misbehavior that is a manifestation of their 
disability, rather than implement an individualized behavior 
management plan.
105
 As a result of these factors, economically 
 
 101. See BENTON ET AL., supra note 85, at vii (stating that status offenders face 
―insurmountable obstacles,‖ including ―desperately poor and violent neighborhoods‖).  
 102. See id. at 130; see also Families Shifting from Private to Public Health Insurance for 
Children, 30 CHILD L. PRACTICE 81, 96 (2011) (finding that families, particularly in rural and 
inner-city areas, are increasingly relying on public health insurance plans to provide coverage 
for their children, a ―growing trend‖ that researchers say is tied to job losses and coverage 
changes to private health insurance plans). 
 103. Rod Plotnik, supra note 100, at 103; Rubin, supra note 10, at 6 (finding that schools in 
low-income neighborhoods struggle to attract top teachers and rely on those who have been 
rejected by more wealthy school districts). 
 104. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 2; see also Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and 
Ethnicity in Juvenile Justice Processing, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 63–64 (Darnell F. 
Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005) (discussing lack of access to resources, 
including health insurance, academic tutoring, and legal assistance, because of low 
socioeconomic status). 
 105. Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Changing the Narrative: Convincing Courts 
to Distinguish between Misbehavior and Criminal Conduct in School Referral Cases, 9 D.C. L. 
REV. 53, 53–54 n.3 (2007); Morgan Smith & Ari Auber, Report Questions How Schools Mete 
Out Discipline, TEXAS TRIB., July 19, 2011 (reporting that ―minorities and special education 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/4
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disadvantaged children are more likely to receive out-of-school 
suspensions and to be expelled than their middle- and upper-middle 
class counterparts, particularly if they are children of color.
106
  
The vast majority of low-income children attend public 
elementary, middle, and high schools in which disciplinary policies 
criminalize the same behavior that is addressed internally at private 
schools.
107
 Since the mid-1990s, ―zero-tolerance‖ has been invoked to 
justify the punishment of public school students for everything from 
profanity, to running in the hall, to doodling on a desk.
108
 Acts that 
may have resulted in an adolescent being sent to the principal‘s office 
now end up in juvenile court charged as disorderly conduct or 
vandalism.
109
 In numerous jurisdictions, campus police officers have 
issued criminal citations to students as young as six for minor 
offenses that carry fines of as much as five-hundred dollars, the 
 
students who caused ‗emotional disturbances‘ were more likely than white students to be 
disciplined‖). 
 106. See CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: STRUCTURING 
LEGAL REFORM 78 (2010) (―Black children are more than three times more likely than whites 
to be suspended today. . . . [S]chools in recent years have begun exercising their disciplinary 
authority to suspend and expel students more frequently and in far more questionable 
circumstances.‖); Rubin, supra note 10, at 6 (finding that schools in low-income neighborhoods 
―may be home to higher percentages of children who are ill prepared to learn,‖ resulting in 
more classroom disruptions, more referrals to the principal, and more suspensions and 
expulsions); Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement 
Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 1016 (2009–10) (finding that 
students who have low socioeconomic status are more likely to be arrested and have higher 
rates of referrals by school officials to police). 
 107. Compare JAMES BELL, FOUNDER AND EXEC. DIR., W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., 
ADDRESS AT THE TENTH ANNUAL ZEALOUS ADVOCACY CONFERENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 
HOUSTON LAW CENTER: DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT (May 20, 2011) (notes on 
file with author); with SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NAT‘L CENTER EDUC. 
STAT. 2011-002, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2010 46–48 (2010), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011002.pdf (finding that a greater percentage of public school 
teachers than private school teachers reported that student misbehavior interfered with their 
teaching). 
 108. See KIM ET AL., supra note 106, at 122–27; Chauncee D. Smith, Note, Deconstructing 
the Pipeline: Evaluating School-to-Prison Pipeline Equal Protection Cases Through a 
Structural Racism Framework, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1009, 1013 (2009); Donna St. George, 
In Texas Schools, a Criminal Response to Misbehavior, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2011 (reporting 
that Connecticut officials began more closely screening cases referred to juvenile court from the 
schools after students were charged with violations ―such as having soda, running in the hall 
and dressing improperly‖).  
 109. See Levick & Schwartz, supra note 105, at 75. 
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payment of which places a particular burden on poor families.
110
 In 
fact, it is commonplace in some states such as Texas for students to 
be arrested and sentenced to jail when they reach age seventeen for 
failure to pay these fines.
111
 In short, increased police presence and 
use of surveillance technology in low-income schools have altered 
the institutional atmosphere, creating a more punitive climate.
112
  
Moreover, public school ―tracking‖ policies, in which students are 
sorted according to academic ability, also feed the pipeline. Statistics 
confirm that schools in poor neighborhoods provide students with 
more vocational tracks and fewer ―college gateway classes.‖113 
Research shows that as a result, tracking fosters low self-esteem and 
exacerbates under-performing students‘ self-perceptions.114 Further, 
research indicates that children who are suspended or otherwise 
excluded from school are more likely to perform poorly on 
standardized tests and to drop out; if they do, they are eight times 
more likely to be incarcerated as those who graduate from high 
school.
115
 In these ways, the ―school-to-prison pipeline‖ channels 
disproportionately large numbers of at-risk youth out of classrooms 
and into juvenile courtrooms each year.
116
  
 
 110. See St. George, supra note 108. 
 111. See, e.g., Brian Thevenot, ACLU Sues Hidalgo for Jailing Teens over Unpaid Tickets, 
TRIBBLOG, TEXAS TRIB. (July 27, 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-dept-criminal-
justice/texas-department-of-criminal-justice/aclu-sues-hidalgo-for-jailing-teens-unpaid-tickets/. 
 112. Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 360–
61, 366–69 (2010–11) (finding that law enforcement officers stationed permanently at schools 
are ―more likely to be found in schools in urban neighborhoods with high poverty‖). 
 113. See JUDITH A. BROWNE, DERAILED: THE SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 9 
(2003) (―[P]oor children are disproportionately slow-tracked into ‗less demanding‘ or 
vocational courses, a track away from college and toward low-paying and low-skilled jobs.‖); 
Smith, supra note 108, at 1036–37. 
 114. BROWNE, supra note 113, at 9; Smith, supra note 108, at 1036–37. 
 115. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW ―ZERO TOLERANCE‖ 
AND HIGH STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 29 (2010), 
http://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/files/publications/rev_fin.pdf; Donald H. Stone 
& Linda S. Stone, Dangerous and Disruptive or Simply Cutting Class: When Should Schools 
Kick Kids to the Curb?: An Empirical Study of School Suspension and Due Process Rights, 13 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 15–17 (2011). 
 116. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 115, at 5; KIM ET AL., supra note 106, at 1; 
see also Kelly Welch & Allison Ann Payne, Racial Threat and Punitive School Discipline, 57 
SOC. PROBS. 25, 25 (2010) (finding that schools with a large percentage of black students are 
not only ―more likely to use punitive disciplinary responses, but also more likely to use 
extremely punitive discipline and to implement zero tolerance policies‖).  
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3. Retail Stores 
In 2008, law enforcement agencies in the United States arrested an 
estimated 2.11 million youth under the age of eighteen.
117
 Over three 
hundred thousand of these juveniles
118
 were arrested for larceny or 
theft crimes.
119
 Seventy-four percent of all juvenile arrests for 
property crimes were for larceny or theft, with shoplifting the most 
common.
120
 After declining significantly between 1997 and 2006, the 
juvenile arrest rate for larceny offenses increased 17 percent from 
2006 to 2008.
121
 
Merchants, whether from small independently-owned local stores 
or franchises affiliated with national corporations, traditionally have 
enormous discretion when handling cases of suspected shoplifting or 
larceny.
122
 When the suspects are minors, this discretion tends to be 
wielded even more freely, as store managers and loss prevention 
associates recognize the potential stigma and harm that can attach 
when cases are referred to juvenile court.
123
 They also appreciate the 
costs involved when store personnel must coordinate with police and 
prosecutors and take time off from work to appear in court.
124
 As a 
result, many acknowledge that as long as the youth‘s parents seem 
―sufficiently concerned,‖ referring the case to law enforcement would 
be ―counterproductive.‖125 Because decisions and judgments must be 
made quickly and with limited information, however, personal biases 
 
 117. Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests 2008, JUV. JUST. BULL. 1 1 (Dec. 2009), https:// 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf.  
 118. The term ―juvenile‖ as it is used here refers to youth younger than eighteen years of 
age. 
 119. CHARLES PUZZANCHERA ET AL., EASY ACCESS TO FBI ARREST STATISTICS 1994–
2007, http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/ (indicating that in 2007, there was an estimated 
300,300 juveniles arrested for larceny-theft crimes in the U.S.). Juveniles accounted for twenty-
six percent of all property crime arrests and eighteen percent of all property crimes that were 
cleared (or ―closed‖) by arrest or otherwise. Puzzanchera, supra note 117, at 1, 2. 
 120. Puzzanchera, supra note 117, at 7.  
 121. Id. 
 122. See KERRY SEGRAVE, SHOPLIFTING: A SOCIAL HISTORY 125–26 (2001); see, e.g., 
Alan D. Axelrod & Thomas Elkind, Note, Merchants‘ Responses to Shoplifting: An Empirical 
Study, 28 STAN. L. REV. 589, 594 (1976). 
 123. Axelrod & Elkind, supra note 122, at 604; see also SEGRAVE, supra note 122, at 125–
26. 
 124. Axelrod & Elkind, supra note 122, at 604; see also SEGRAVE, supra note 122, at 152. 
 125. Axelrod & Elkind, supra note 122, at 604.  
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and stereotyping can enter into the calculus; store representatives 
admit that the child‘s demeanor, degree of remorse, and parental 
attitude are among the most important factors.
126
  
Many businesses have adopted theft policies that explicitly favor 
those of means over low-income individuals. Researchers have found 
that ―private corporate police help create and sustain the link between 
social class and street crime by skimming the advantaged for civil 
recovery and sending larger numbers of poor people into the embrace 
of the public criminal justice system.‖127 For example, anecdotal 
evidence reveals that at more than one national ―big box‖ store, 
parents of children who have shoplifted are led to believe that if they 
―settle‖ the store‘s civil claim for the costs of recovering the stolen 
merchandise, the store will not report the incident to the police.
128
 
The settlement amount varies, as it may be governed by state statute 
or store policy,
129
 but it can be as much as $200.
130
 The offer is 
typically made to the parent or guardian when the child is in the 
custody of store personnel, raising possible claims of extortion.
131
 
Although the store‘s offer to release the child and forego juvenile 
court prosecution in exchange for payment is not always explicit, 
many parents wrongly assume that a proposal to ―settle‖ is the 
equivalent of an agreement not to pursue formal charges.
132
 
 
 126. Id.; see also SEGRAVE, supra note 122, at 126 (―Analysis revealed . . . that retail value 
of the item taken, neighborhood social class, and physical resistance were among the factors 
determining private corporate justice for shoplifters in a civil recovery state.‖). 
 127. SEGRAVE, supra note 122, at 127. 
 128. See Richard C. Halverson, Civil Recovery Helps Chains Stem Losses from Shoplifting, 
CBS INTERACTIVE BUSINESS NETWORK RESOURCE LIBRARY (Sept. 26, 1988), http://find 
articles.com/p/articles/mi_m3092/is_n19_v27/ai_6680648/; notes of author (May 2, 2011) (on 
file with author); E-mail from Lisa H. Thurau, Strategies for Youth, Boston, Ma., to author 
(Aug. 24, 2011) (on file with author); E-mail from Roger Starcher, Investigator, Council for 
Children‘s Rights, Charlotte, N.C., to author (Aug. 24, 2011) (on file with author).  
 129. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1.538.2 (2010), available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/ 
gascripts/statutes/statutelookup.pl?statute=1-538.2 (enumerating the civil penalties for 
shoplifting, larceny, and related offenses). 
 130. See E-mail from Tobie J. Smith, Legal Aid Society of Birmingham, Ala., to author 
(Aug. 24, 2011) (on file with author); E-mail from Jennie Wingad, Assistant Public Defender, 
Miami, Fla., to author (Aug. 24, 2011) (on file with author). 
 131. See CHARLES A. SENNEWALD ET AL., RETAIL CRIME, SECURITY, AND LOSS 
PREVENTION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC REFERENCE 51 (2008). 
 132. E-mail from Jacqueline Boulos, to author (Aug. 24, 2011) (on file with author); E-
mail from Barbara L. Krier, Sr. Assistant Public Defender, York, Pa., to author (Aug. 24, 2011) 
(on file with author); E-mail from Tobie J. Smith, supra note 130.  
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Moreover, the retailer‘s corporate office may decide to pursue civil 
damages against the child‘s parents regardless of the representations 
made by store personnel, creating yet another distressing scenario for 
low-income juveniles and their families.
133
 Such policies are 
compounded by the fact that, according to various studies, 
department store security officers are generally more likely to accuse 
those who appear to be poor and are less likely to release them from 
custody.
134
  
4. Neighborhood Police Presence 
―Broken Windows‖ policing, or the concept that correcting visible 
signs of social disorder fosters the creation of a safe and stable 
community, was first articulated by James Q. Wilson and George L. 
Kelling in 1982.
135
 The strategy called for increased policing of 
minor offenses, such as graffiti, vandalism, and public drinking, in 
order to reduce serious crime.
136
 Partially as a function of this theory, 
beginning in the 1990s, higher concentrations of police officers were 
assigned to low-income urban neighborhoods,
137
 a practice that has 
persisted in many cities.
138
  
There is much legal scholarship that challenges Broken Windows 
theory by asserting, inter alia, that police presence is itself a 
 
 133. See Marisa McIntyre, Civil vs. Criminal: What is the Difference?, LP MAGAZINE 
(Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.lpportal.com/legal-briefs/item/1075-civil-vs-criminal-what-is-the-
difference?.html.  
 134. SEGRAVE, supra note 122, at 147. 
 135. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 (setting out the Broken Windows 
theory). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, 
and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 457, 461–63 (2000) (―Beginning 
in 1994, officials altered the police strategies in New York City to address low-level disorder 
problems that might invite more serious crime problems. These signs of disorder often are more 
prevalent in urban neighborhoods with elevated rates of poverty and social fragmentation.‖); 
Solomon J. Greene, Note, Vicious Streets: The Crisis of the Industrial City and the Invention of 
Juvenile Justice, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 164–65 (2003). 
 138. See Henry G. Sontheimer, From the Literature: Study Finds Race and Class have 
Both Main and Interaction Effects on Juvenile Arrests, 17 JUV. JUST. UPDATE 9 (Aug.–Sept. 
2011) (―Research shows that police organize their patrols areas according to race and class 
divisions and that most police believe minority neighborhoods are more likely to experience 
crime.‖). 
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criminogenic factor in poor neighborhoods.
139
 Empirical research has 
suggested that because of stereotypes linked to race and class, police 
officers place lesser value on residents of impoverished areas, 
particularly those with high minority concentrations.
140
 In contrast, 
police attitudes toward those who live in wealthier areas tend to be 
lax and forgiving, and officers are less inclined to proceed with 
criminal charges against upper-income youth because of displays of 
parental ―outrage‖ and ―investment‖ in their children.141 As a result, 
criminal charges are brought more frequently against children in low-
income communities than in more affluent ones.
142
  
In recent years a burgeoning literature has developed that 
questions the traditional approach of law enforcement toward young 
people.
143
 The critique asserts that little effort is made institutionally 
to prepare the police for interactions with teens or young suspects.
144
 
Research confirms that officers wrongly assume that youth will 
respond no differently than, and pose the same risks as, adults.
145
 
They are ill-equipped to determine whether young offenders should 
be brought to the police station upon arrest or to the emergency room 
for treatment of mental illness or drug addiction.
146
 They are not 
trained to view conflict between adolescents as an opportunity to 
model such strategies as mediation and peaceful discussion, and they 
are given few tools for avoiding the classic pattern of confrontation, 
 
 139. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF 
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 73, 76, 77, 79–81 (2001); RALPH B. TAYLOR, BREAKING AWAY 
FROM BROKEN WINDOWS: BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, 
GRIME, FEAR, AND DECLINE 371–74 (2001); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken 
Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 271, 276 (2009). 
 140. Bishop, supra note 104, at 45. 
 141. Lisa H. Thurau, Rethinking How We Police Youth: Incorporating Knowledge of 
Adolescence into Policing Teens, 29 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 30, 35–36 (2009). 
 142. Bishop, supra note 104, at 165–66; Sontheimer, supra note 138, at 9 (reporting on a 
longitudinal study finding that low socio-economic status significantly increased arrest risk for 
juveniles). 
 143. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Children, Cops and Citizenship: Why Conservatives 
Should Oppose Racial Profiling, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 150, 151 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesnet-Lind eds., 2002); Thurau, 
supra note 141, at 30–31. 
 144. E.g., Thurau, supra note 141, at 30–31. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. at 34. 
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escalation, and arrest when encountering youth on the street or in 
their homes.
147
 Also, there is minimal review of or accountability for 
many decisions made by police in the field, and records of encounters 
with juveniles are ―seldom maintained.‖148 Similarly, little effort is 
made by local communities to educate young people as to what 
constitutes criminal conduct or to teach them the most appropriate 
ways to engage with police.
149
 As a result, interactions between law 
enforcement and low-income youth are often characterized by the use 
of force, which leads to high rates of arrest, incarceration, and court 
involvement.
150
  
B. Needs-Based Delinquency 
Because of the traditional philosophy of juvenile court,
151
 the 
potential for class status to impact decision-making within the system 
has always been great.
152
 The first juvenile codes provided court 
officials with enormous discretionary authority. Judgments had to be 
made quickly, often based on very limited information, and court 
actors generally lacked ―substantive criteria‖ to guide them in 
determining what factors should be considered and what weight they 
should be given.
153
 These characteristics of the original delinquency 
system continue to be reflected in the laws and policies of the twenty-
first century juvenile court. The legislation that governs juvenile 
court practice in each state commonly contains provisions that 
explicitly call for consideration of the child‘s needs and the family‘s 
socioeconomic status. Court policies give decision-makers wide 
discretion to consider these factors at critical stages in the case. As a 
result, typical features of juvenile court laws and practices combine 
to shift the system‘s emphasis from an evaluation of a child‘s 
culpability to an assessment of the family‘s class status. In this way, 
needs-based delinquency becomes the norm.  
 
 147. Id. at 31, 38–39.  
 148. Bishop, supra note 104, at 35. 
 149. Thurau, supra note 141, at 39. 
 150. See id. at 30. 
 151. See supra notes 22–61 and accompanying text. 
 152. Bishop, supra note 104, at 46. 
 153. Id. at 46. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:53 
 
 
1. Intake and Detention Decisions 
State juvenile codes typically use very general language to 
describe the screening process and the evaluation of a juvenile 
delinquency complaint in order to determine whether it should be 
filed as a petition.
154
 Many codes require that ―legal sufficiency‖ be 
found before any further action is taken.
155
 This requires that the 
intake officer determine whether there are ―reasonable grounds‖ to 
believe that the facts alleged are true, whether the facts as alleged 
constitute a delinquent offense within the jurisdiction of the court, 
and whether the facts alleged are ―sufficiently serious‖ to warrant 
court action.
156
 Typically the code contains no definition, description 
or explanatory criteria for the terms setting out the purpose and 
procedures of the intake process.
157
 Upon a finding of legal 
sufficiency, the code calls for the intake officer to consider additional 
criteria set forth by the probation department, which may ―if 
practicable‖ include interviews with the complainant, juvenile, 
juvenile‘s parent, and ―persons known to have relevant information‖ 
about the juvenile or her family.
158
 Generally, state juvenile codes 
provide little additional guidance.  
Some codes require that the juvenile delinquency petition not only 
establish reasonable cause to believe that the juvenile committed the 
crimes alleged but also include a statement that the juvenile ―requires 
supervision, treatment or confinement.‖159 In other words, only the 
complaints against children who need the services of the probation 
department may be filed as delinquency petitions. In these systems, 
there are two explicit tracks: one for middle- and upper-class families 
who are able to secure private services for their children, such as drug 
or alcohol treatment and mental health counseling, and the other for 
 
 154. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.145 (1)(a)-(c)2 (West 2010) (stating that the juvenile 
probation officer shall make a ―preliminary determination‖ as to whether the complaint is 
―complete,‖ and stating that the officer shall ―screen each child‖ in order to determine such 
factors as ―the presence of…educational, or vocational problems, or other conditions that may 
have caused the child to come to the attention of law enforcement. . . .‖). 
 155. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1702 (2011). 
 156. Id. § 7B-1700. 
 157. See, e.g., id. §§ 7B-1501, 1700–06. 
 158. Id. § 7B-1702. 
 159. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 311.1-.2 (2008). 
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low-income (often minority and single-parent) families who can only 
access these resources through a court order following a juvenile 
delinquency adjudication.
160
 In this way, the family‘s ability to obtain 
services is a critical factor in the determination of whether a child 
will face formal delinquency charges.
161
  
Empirical research by Donna Bishop, among others, on the 
negative impact of race on juvenile court processing also supports a 
finding that poor children are less likely to be diverted from the 
system and more likely to be detained than children of means.
162
 
Although the policies and regulations that Bishop analyzed were not 
developed with an explicit intent to discriminate against low-income 
families (or families of color), they nevertheless have a ―negative and 
differential impact‖ on this population.163 For example, in many 
jurisdictions it is a policy of the juvenile court probation department 
that if a child‘s parents cannot be readily contacted and if they do not 
appear for an initial interview, the juvenile is ineligible for 
diversion.
164
 In some jurisdictions, the policy calls for automatic 
detention of the child under these circumstances.
165
 Further, most 
juvenile codes prohibit the release of a child from detention if the 
parent cannot provide ―suitable supervision, care, or protection,‖166 
which could be interpreted to include parents or guardians who work 
unpredictable hours, nights, or weekends. Release on electronic 
monitoring generally is contingent upon having a residential land-
line, which increasing numbers of low-income families lack, and it 
 
 160. Bishop, supra note 104, at 50; Rubin, supra note 10, at 2 (―[M]iddle- or upper-class 
parents often have the resources to successfully delay or short-circuit court action while they 
get their sons or daughters into mental health or drug treatment.‖). 
 161. See Tina L. Freiburger & Kareem L. Jordan, A Multilevel Analysis of Race on the 
Decision to Petition a Case in the Juvenile Court, 1 RACE & JUST. 185, 198 (2011) (―Prior 
research also has suggested that court officials may refer youths to juvenile court to provide 
access to needed services.‖). 
 162. Bishop, supra note 104, at 48–50; Freiburger & Jordan, supra note 161, at 198 
(finding that in areas with higher rates of poverty, youth are more likely to be petitioned into 
juvenile delinquency court). 
 163. Bishop, supra note 104, at 48. 
 164. Id. at 48–49; see also Rubin, supra note 10, at 2 (―The parents of low-income youth 
often do not contest an arrest as vigorously as more affluent middle-income parents might.‖); 
supra note 2 and accompanying text (defining juvenile court diversion plans). 
 165. Bishop, supra note 104, at 48–49. 
 166. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.01(e)(2) (West 2011).  
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can include an installation fee and a daily charge for equipment 
use.
167
 Therefore, families without home phone lines or who have 
inconsistent access to transportation, unreliable child care, or 
inflexible work schedules will inevitably have difficulty complying 
with these policies.  
Similarly, diversion to informal probation or community-based 
sanctions or services often requires that the child admit guilt at the 
first point of contact with the juvenile court, premised on the belief 
that an admission signals a child‘s openness to treatment.168 While 
there is little research on whether class status impacts the likelihood 
that a juvenile will acknowledge guilt to a probation officer at 
intake,
169
 studies on race have shown that white children admit guilt 
more frequently at this early stage than do children of color.
170
 Again, 
whether this is a function of the fact that children of color are more 
likely than whites to be arrested and therefore more likely to be 
innocent of criminal charges, is unclear. Reluctance to admit one‘s 
guilt prior to the filing of formal charges may also result from distrust 
of court officials or the system itself, feelings that economically 
disadvantaged youth experience at similar rates as minority youth. 
Nonetheless, many juvenile probation officers perceive that children 
who initially refuse to admit guilt lack sufficient remorse, providing 
an additional reason for court officials to not recommend diversion.
171
 
In all these ways the intake process is highly subjective and serves to 
cast a wider net around poor children and their families.  
 
 167. See AM. BAR ASS‘N, RES. 104D 4–6 (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/house_of_delegates/104d_2011_my.authcheckdam.pdf; STACEY L. 
SKLAVER, THE PROS AND CONS OF USING ELECTRONIC MONITORING PROGRAMS IN JUVENILE 
CASES 2, 3 http://www2.americanbar.org/sections/criminaljustice/.../jjSklaver.doc. http://www 
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/jjSklaver.
doc (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).  
 168. Bishop, supra note 104, at 49.  
 169. A search of social science databases revealed no studies that directly explored this 
question. 
 170. Bishop, supra note 104, at 49. 
 171. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/4
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2. Right to Counsel 
Although In re Gault established the right to counsel for children 
in juvenile court in 1967,
172
 the Supreme Court indicated in dicta that 
counsel may be waived if both the child and parent agree.
173
 Forty-
five years later, ―very few states require mandatory appointment of 
counsel . . . with no option for waiver.
174
 In some cases, waiver may 
occur under limited circumstances.
175
 In the majority of jurisdictions, 
children are allowed to waive counsel at any stage of the proceeding, 
as long as it is determined to be ―knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary.‖176 Empirical evidence shows, however, that few juveniles 
are cognitively or developmentally capable of comprehending and 
executing a valid waiver of the right to counsel.
177
  
For low-income families, this state of affairs is particularly 
troubling.
178
 Many states require parents to pay indigence or 
application fees as well as other surcharges when they apply for legal 
representation, encouraging the waiver of counsel from the very 
 
 172. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).  
 173. Id. at 41–42. 
 174. See Birckhead, supra note 74, at 1489. 
 175. See RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE 
COURT 54–55 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that some state legislatures prohibit juveniles from waiving 
counsel, while others permit them but only after the youth has been fully advised of the 
consequences of waiver by an attorney); Tory J. Caeti et al., Juvenile Right to Counsel: A 
National Comparison of State Legal Codes, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 611, 622–23 (finding that 
seventeen states have very strict waiver requirements).  
 176. See Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of 
Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 316–18 (2003). 
 177. THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES‘ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
COMPETENCE 193–94 (Bruce Dennis Sales ed., 1981). 
 178. See AM. BAR ASS‘N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATLANTIC JUVENILE DEFENDER 
CTR., MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF 
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 1–2, 28 (Elizabeth Cumming et al. eds., 
2003), http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mdreport.pdf (showing that poor and minority children are 
most affected by unchecked policies and practices that allow for uneven access to counsel and 
insufficient representation.‖); AM. BAR ASS‘N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & S. JUVENILE 
DEFENDER CTR., NORTH CAROLINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY 
OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 1 (Lynn Grindall ed., 2003), 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ncreport.pdf (―The [juvenile defense] system as it is presently 
structured is, at best, uneven, and clearly has had a disproportionate impact on poor and 
minority children.‖); TEXAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 77, at 5 (―Too many young people are 
churned through the system and are often left literally defenseless. More often than not, these 
youngsters are low income, children of color.‖). 
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beginning of the process.
179
 When juveniles lack legal representation, 
they face systemic pressures to admit rather than contest the 
charges.
180
 Even when lawyers have been retained, parents may not 
agree to the hiring of experts or investigators in order to avoid 
incurring additional fees—or they may encourage their children to 
forego evidentiary hearings or time-intensive defenses.
181
 Further, 
when the family bears the cost of representation, an attorney is more 
likely to defer to the juvenile‘s parents with respect to the direction of 
the litigation, creating a potential conflict of interest.
182
 This situation 
can be compounded when the parent or other family member is the 
complaining witness in the case.
183
 Moreover, in most jurisdictions—
 
 179. See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ, NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER & CATHRYN 
CRAWFORD, CHILDREN AND FAMILY JUSTICE CENTER, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL 
OF LAW, FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION 
IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 2, 5, 33 (2006) [hereinafter FLORIDA ASSESSMENT], http:// 
www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf (―Statutory provisions requiring parents to pay 
fees to apply for and then access lawyers deter youth from exercising the right to counsel. On 
the basis of frequently slipshod indigence determinations, families are forced to choose between 
incurring costs that they cannot afford and acquiring representation for their children.‖); AM. 
BAR ASS‘N JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO 
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO 1 (Kim 
Brooks & Darlene Kamine eds., 2003), http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Ohio_Assessment.pdf 
(―Numerous obstacles exist for Ohio‘s poor children to obtain lawyers in the juvenile justice 
system. It has become a tolerated if not accepted practice that large numbers of poor youth 
waive their right to an attorney in Ohio, even during the most critical stages of proceedings, 
without proper colloquies from judges and magistrates.‖); WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT, supra 
note 76, at 28 (―Defenders surveyed believe that in 43% percent of cases where a child proceeds 
without counsel, it is because parents insist on it. This is likely due to parents‘ concerns over 
cost, since many counties charge a fee for public defense services. An alarming 38% of 
attorneys said that the waiver often occurs before a child has had a chance to consult with an 
attorney.‖).  
 180. CATHRYN CRAWFORD ET AL., CHILDREN AND FAMILY JUSTICE CENTER, 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW & NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, 
ILLINOIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 35 (2007) [hereinafter ILLINOIS ASSESSMENT], http://www.njdc 
.info/pdf/illinois_assessment.pdf (―The requirement that poor parents pay legal fees may put 
undue pressure on a child to enter an early admission in a case and compromise his attorney‘s 
ability to fully explore a defense and/or dispositional alternative.‖). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.; Janet R. Fink, Who Decides: The Role of Parent or Guardian in Juvenile 
Delinquency Representation, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 
119, 122–23 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995); Kristin Henning, Defining the Lawyer-Self: Using 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Define the Lawyer‘s Role and Build Alliances that Aid the Child 
Client, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING 
PROFESSION 411, 424 (Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007). 
 183. See, e.g., MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., THE NATIONAL JUVENILE DEFENDER CENTER, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/4
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including those few in which juveniles are presumed to be indigent 
and waiver of counsel is prohibited by statute
184—the quality of 
representation in delinquency court is substandard.
185
 Low-income 
families, however, have no recourse, as they lack the ability to retain 
private counsel of their own choosing.  
3. Adjudication 
In 1971, the Supreme Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania that 
juveniles do not possess a federal constitutional right to trial by jury, 
under either the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause.
186
 The 
decision was premised on the notion that accurate fact-finding could 
be accomplished without juries, and that the imposition of juries into 
the system would convert ―intimate, informal protective 
proceeding[s]‖ into ―a fully adversary process.‖187 Forty years later, 
most state juvenile codes allow only for bench—and not jury—trials 
for juveniles who do not admit guilt.
188
 Approximately ten states have 
 
SOUTH CAROLINA: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE: A REPORT ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND 
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 27–28 (2010), http://www.njdc 
.info/pdf/south_carolina_assessment.pdf.  
 184. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2000(a) (2011) (―Counsel for the juvenile shall be 
appointed . . . in any proceeding in which the juvenile is alleged to be . . . delinquent.‖) 
(emphasis added); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2000(b) (2011) (―All juveniles shall be conclusively 
presumed to be indigent, and it shall not be necessary for the court to receive from any juvenile 
an affidavit of indigency.‖) (emphasis added).  
 185. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for 
Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 289–92 (2007) (―[M]any juvenile defendants 
are victims of ineffective assistance of counsel.‖); Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding 
Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 771, 791–92 (2010) (stating that assessments of juvenile defender systems 
demonstrate that performance standards and ethical rules ―appear to be honored mostly in the 
breach‖); see also AM BAR ASS‘N JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, MONTANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 28 
(Brock Albin et al. eds., 2003), http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mtreport.pdf (―The fact that most 
juvenile defendants come from poor families—and thus have very limited resources to assist the 
defender—significantly increases the burden placed on the defender to provide adequate 
representation.‖). 
 186. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971).  
 187. Id. at 543–47. 
 188. See Linda A. Szymanski, Juveniles‘ Right to a Jury Trial (2007 Update), NCJJ 
SNAPSHOT 1, Feb. 2008 (stating that thirty states and the District of Columbia have statutory or 
case law denying juveniles the right to a jury trial). 
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enacted statutes allowing jury trials in juvenile cases,
189
 while another 
ten provide for them under limited special circumstances.
190
 In 2008, 
when holding that juveniles have the right to trial by jury, the Kansas 
Supreme Court found that McKeiver was no longer binding; its 
decision was premised on the view that punitive legislation passed in 
the intervening quarter-century had so eroded the distinctions 
between the juvenile and criminal justice systems that the juvenile 
court‘s ―benevolent, parens patriae character‖ had been irrevocably 
compromised.
191
 
Advocates and legal scholars argue that jury trials should be made 
available to juveniles in delinquency court based on notions of 
fairness and the quality of judicial fact-finding.
192
 Their arguments 
are often grounded in procedural justice theory, the concept that 
adolescents are less likely to reoffend if they perceive the court 
process as fair.
193
 Reviewing appellate case law in bench trials, legal 
scholars have found that judges are more likely than jurors to weigh 
evidence in favor of the prosecution and less likely to assess the 
credibility of the accused with an open mind, particularly in juvenile 
court.
194
 It has been conceded, however, that the jury trial right can be 
a mere ―chip to be used in the poker game of plea bargaining,‖ the 
loss of which is hardly ―catastrophic,‖ given that the penalties 
available in juvenile court generally are not as punitive as in adult 
criminal court.
195
 Regardless of one‘s view, the reality is that in the 
 
 189. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 175, at 365. 
 190. Birckhead, supra note 74, at 1451 n.20. 
 191. In re L.M., 186 P.3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2008). 
 192. See, e.g., Gerald P. Hill, II, Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury 
Trials in Juvenile Proceedings Under the Sixth Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143, 172–
75 (2008); Ellen Marrus, ―That Isn‘t Fair, Judge‖: The Costs of Using Prior Juvenile 
Delinquency Adjudications in Criminal Court Sentencing, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1323, 1350–51 
(2003–04); Steven A. Drizin, Op-Ed., Juveniles Deserve Jury Trials, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 1999, 
at 31. 
 193. See, e.g., Susan E. Brooks, Juvenile Injustice: The Ban on Jury Trials for Juveniles in 
the District of Columbia, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 875, 894 (1994–95); see also Birckhead, 
supra note 74, at 1484–88.  
 194. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and 
Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 
562–71 (1998) (―The case law suggests that judges often convict on evidence so scant that only 
the most closed-minded or misguided juror could think the evidence satisfied the standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.‖). 
 195. See, e.g., Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/4
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vast majority of jurisdictions, juveniles who contest the validity of 
the charges against them have no option but to rely on an individual 
judge to make an assessment of whether the state has proven its case.  
The lack of a jury trial right and the reliance on juvenile court 
judges to be objective fact-finders has a disproportionate effect on 
poor children and their families. In many jurisdictions, there is a 
single judge who presides over juvenile court, and delinquency 
sessions are held only two or three times per month.
196
 As a result, 
the judge who presides over a bench trial is often the same judge who 
determined whether the family was indigent and qualified for 
appointed counsel, reviewed the child‘s personal history and prior 
delinquency record, and decided whether the child should be 
detained.
197
 It may also be the same judge who presides over the 
jurisdiction‘s abuse and neglect cases.198 This judge typically has 
long-established relationships and rapport with the prosecutor, 
arresting officer, and probation officer—each of whom may be the 
only one from their respective offices assigned to juvenile court in 
that district.
199
 Therefore, the judge presiding over a juvenile court 
bench trial likely has preconceived notions regarding the child‘s guilt 
or—at the very least—an opinion as to whether the family has 
―needs‖ that the system should address.200 
Empirical research on the adjudicatory stage, which has focused 
on the impact of race but has not addressed the influence of 
socioeconomic class, has mixed results. Several studies found that 
race has no effect, while findings of minority disadvantage are less 
common.
201
 Somewhat surprisingly, most empirical researchers have 
found that whites are ―considerably more likely‖ to be adjudicated 
delinquent than minorities.
202
 Donna Bishop has surmised that 
 
Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 169. 
 196. See Birckhead, supra note 76, at 971–73. 
 197. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 194, at 570 n.64. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. at 568. 
 200. Id. at 570 (stating that juvenile court judges ―may inappropriately lean in favor of 
conviction in order to ensure that youths in need of rehabilitative services receive them as a 
condition of probation or placement‖). 
 201. Bishop, supra note 104, at 53. 
 202. Id.; Devon J. Green & Megan S. Shafer, The Faces Within: An Examination of the 
Disparate Treatment of Minority Youth Throughout the North Carolina Juvenile Justice System, 
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because of the ―extralegal variables‖ at the arrest and referral stages 
that disadvantage poor and minority children, these cases ―may on 
the whole be weaker‖ for the prosecution than those of non-
minorities and children of means.
203
 As a result, judges will more 
readily introduce a ―correction‖ when the decision calls for a 
―singular focus‖ on whether the state has met its burden of proof.204 
Whether judges are, in fact, more likely to make objective 
determinations at adjudication than at other stages of the case remains 
an open question. Bishop acknowledges that tests of this hypothesis 
require measures of the strength of the state‘s evidence, which are 
―difficult to construct.‖205  
4. Disposition and Probation 
The dispositional phase of juvenile delinquency cases differs from 
adult criminal court more than any other stage.
206
 The juvenile codes 
of most states place few evidentiary limits on the information that is 
admissible at disposition; in fact, some statutes explicitly state that 
the court may consider any evidence, including hearsay, that it 
considers to be ―relevant, reliable, and necessary‖ to determine the 
juvenile‘s needs.207 Further, when entering the dispositional order, 
judges have wide discretion to impose whatever terms and conditions 
they deem appropriate.
208
 The range of alternative dispositions 
available to the court is extremely broad, and in most jurisdictions 
there are no formulas requiring specific sentences for particular 
crimes.
209
 Moreover, defense counsel are often unfamiliar with the 
resources and programs available to their clients and lack the 
assessment expertise (or the funds to hire a psychologist, psychiatrist, 
 
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 727, 737–38 (2005) (finding that across North Carolina, minorities 
were ―slightly less likely to be found delinquent‖ during adjudicatory hearings than white 
juveniles, and that Hispanic youth were ―considerably less likely‖ than white youth to be found 
delinquent).  
 203. Bishop, supra note 104, at 53. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. HERTZ ET AL., supra note 175, at 689. 
 207. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2501(a) (2011).  
 208. HERTZ ET AL., supra note 175, at 691. 
 209. Id. at 690–91. 
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or social worker) to offer a persuasive counterweight to the 
recommendations of the probation officer, placing the juvenile at a 
distinct disadvantage.
210
 
Similar to other stages of delinquency cases, children of limited 
means are negatively impacted by the laws and policies that prevail at 
disposition and during probation. For instance, the judge or probation 
officer often assesses fees and costs that parents have not anticipated, 
which can serve as an added stressor for families already struggling 
with the issues that originally placed their children under juvenile 
court jurisdiction.
211
 Likewise, it is not uncommon for youth on 
probation to complete all of their conditions except for the payment 
of fees, leading to an extension of probation and the assessment of 
additional fees, and so ―the vicious cycle continues.‖212 The failure to 
pay fees while on probation can also lead to its revocation, resulting 
in commitment of the juvenile to a detention center or training 
school.
213
 In addition, low-income families may lack reliable 
transportation, making it more difficult for the child to complete 
court-ordered programs, or they may have a transient living situation, 
impacting the provision of services while serving as a factor that 
favors removing the child from the home.
214
  
 
 210. Birckhead, supra note 76, at 976–77. 
 211. See, e.g., FLORIDA ASSESSMENT, supra note 179, at 34.  
 212. See, e.g., ELIZABETH GLADDEN KEHOE, NAT‘L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR. & KIM 
BROOKS TANDY, CENT. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR. & CHILDREN‘S LAW CTR., INDIANA: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 45 (2006), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Indiana%20Assessment.pdf.  
 213. See, e.g., JESSIE BECK, PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT‘L 
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NEBRASKA: JUVENILE LEGAL DEFENSE: A REPORT ON ACCESS TO 
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN IN NEBRASKA 68 (2009) 
[hereinafter NEBRASKA ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/nebraska_ 
assessment.pdf (―As one contract attorney observed, since youth need to have money to last on 
probation, poor children are more likely to end up committed and in detention.‖); see also supra 
note 3 (discussing the terminology for juvenile prisons). 
 214. See BELL, supra note 9, at 9; see also SCOTT W. ALLARD, OUT OF REACH: PLACE, 
POVERTY, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2009) (discussing ―how place matters to 
the safety net,‖ and finding that ―[l]imitations of public transportation in many high-poverty 
areas and low rates of automobile ownership among low-income households make it even more 
critical that providers be located nearby‖). 
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C. Perceptions and Attitudes 
In addition to the points of entry and the provisions within state 
juvenile codes that allow for an emphasis on families‘ needs when 
adjudicating delinquency, the ―orientations and concerns‖ of the 
decision-makers at each stage of the process also contribute to the 
over-representation of poor children in delinquency court.
215
 For 
decades it has been well-documented that children of color are 
disproportionately represented in the juvenile justice system.
216
 As 
early as 1973, empirical studies have indicated that socioeconomic 
status also impacts decision-making, demonstrating—for instance—
that poor children are more likely to receive severe dispositions than 
children of means.
217
 The explanation for this unequal treatment 
centers on the theory that because of limited time and information, 
judges and other decision-makers develop a ―perceptual shorthand‖218 
that relies on common stereotypes associated with offender 
characteristics, such as race and class, as well as legal factors, such as 
the seriousness of the offense and the juvenile‘s criminal history.219 
Thus, actors within the system make assessments about juveniles‘ 
culpability, dangerousness, and treatment needs based on contextual 
and extralegal factors, including socioeconomic status, employment 
status, and education level of the child‘s parents or guardians.220  
 
 215. Donna M. Bishop et al., Contexts of Decision Making in the Juvenile Justice System: 
An Organizational Approach to Understanding Minority Overrepresentation, 8 YOUTH 
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 213, 214 (2010).  
 216. See, e.g., Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Minority Youths and Juvenile Justice: 
Disproportionate Minority Contact After Nearly 20 Years of Reform Efforts, 5 YOUTH 
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 71, 72–74 (2007) (finding that for 2002, black youth represented 16 
percent of the juvenile population in the U.S. but comprised 29 percent of cases referred to 
juvenile court, 36 percent of those detained, 32 percent of those processed formally, 29 percent 
of those adjudicated delinquent, 33 percent of those given out-of-home dispositions, and 35 
percent of those waived into adult criminal court). 
 217. Terence P. Thornberry, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Sentencing in the Juvenile 
Justice System, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90, 97 (1973). 
 218. Darnell F. Hawkins, Causal Attribution and Punishment for Crime, 2 DEVIANT 
BEHAV. 207, 207–08 (1981).  
 219. Bishop et al., supra note 215, at 214; Alan J. Tomkins et al., Subtle Discrimination in 
Juvenile Justice Decisionmaking: Social Scientific Perspectives and Explanations, 29 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1619, 1649–50 (1996). 
 220. Bishop et al., supra note 215, at 215. 
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Although the juvenile court has shifted its emphasis since the 
1960s and 1970s from rehabilitation to that of punishment, 
accountability, and community safety, the processing of juveniles 
continues to be affected by the biases of decision-makers at all stages 
of the case. Moreover, there is little review of or accountability for 
decisions made within the system, contributing to the potential for 
discrimination on the basis of socioeconomic status.
221
 The trend is 
evidenced through state assessments of access to and quality of 
counsel that have examined the perceptions and attitudes of the 
various actors in the system. 
For instance, probation officers in juvenile court wield 
tremendous power at both the front and back ends of the process.
222
 
They are often the ―best informed people in the courtroom and have 
the most sustained contact with the child[ren]‖ themselves.223 During 
intake, they determine whom to divert and whom to petition.
224
 Their 
detention recommendations are readily accepted by the court, and 
they have great sway over the judge at disposition.
225
 Because of the 
resource-strapped budgets of most juvenile courts, probation officers 
often seek some form of incarceration for those with ―serious 
emotional, addiction, or behavioral problems,‖ as they believe that 
these juveniles are unlikely to receive necessary community-based 
services or comply with treatment while on probation.
226
 Thus, when 
probation officers internalize the facile clichés and negative 
stereotypes about ―bad kids,‖ children from poor families (and 
children of color) are disproportionately harmed.
227
  
 
 221. Id. at 247. 
 222. See, e.g., LAVAL S. MILLER-WILSON ET AL., JUVENILE LAW CENTER, & PATRICIA 
PURITZ, AM. BAR ASS‘N, JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTER, PENNSYLVANIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 45 
(2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/pareport.pdf (describing instances in which 
judicial deference to probation officers results in their ―almost complete influence over youths‘ 
fates‖).  
 223. See Birckhead, supra note 76, at 975–77. 
 224. See id. n.82. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See, e.g., WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT, supra note 76, at 38 (―Often the probation 
officer or prosecutor will seek a higher sentence because the offender has serious emotional, 
addiction or behavioral problems, and community-based resources have not been secured.‖). 
 227. See, e.g., George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments 
of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 
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Similarly, judges and prosecutors have significant influence over 
who enters the juvenile justice system, what happens to them when 
they are in it, and who is transferred into adult criminal court for 
prosecution. In most jurisdictions, there is no check on prosecutorial 
discretion regarding whom to charge, what to charge, and whom to 
transfer to criminal court.
228
 In fact, it is documented that in some 
states, county level prosecutors have financial incentives to transfer 
young offenders into adult court, allowing them to pass on the costs 
of often-expensive individualized treatment to the state.
229
 Moreover, 
the statutory criteria for judicial waiver from juvenile to adult 
criminal court, which are framed in terms of ―amenability to 
treatment‖ or ―dangerousness,‖ typically give judges ―broad, 
standardless discretion.‖230 Likewise, as discussed earlier, most 
 
554, 567 (1998) (finding that probation officers more frequently attribute black youths‘ 
delinquency to ―negative attitudinal and personality traits,‖ judge black youths to be more 
dangerous than white youths, and recommend more severe sentences to black youths than 
whites, because they attribute their crimes to ―negative personality traits‖); Sandra Graham & 
Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 499 (2004) (finding that racial disparities in the juvenile justice 
system might be due to the ―unconscious racial stereotypes of those who determine the fate of 
offending youth,‖ including police and probation officers, and that ―[e]ven decision makers 
with good intentions are susceptible‖). 
 228. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, You‘ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile 
Justice Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 511, 515 (2009). 
 229. See, e.g., SELENA TEJI & MIKE MALES, CNTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUST., AN 
ANALYSIS OF DIRECT ADULT CRIMINAL COURT FILING 2003–2009: WHAT HAS BEEN THE 
EFFECT OF PROPOSITION 21? 1 (2011), available at http://thecrimereport.s3.amazonaws.com/2/ 
ed/1/1174/what_has_been_the_effect_of_prop_21.pdf (studying prosecutorial use of direct 
adult criminal court filing in California, and finding that Ventura and Orange County 
prosecutors disproportionately targeted younger offenders who, if convicted and sentenced to 
confinement, served their time in state-run youth correctional facilities, rather than older youth 
who would have served time in county-run adult facilities); Celeste Fremon, Is Ventura Trying 
More Kids as Adults than Any Other County . . . for the Money?, WITNESS L.A. , Aug. 26, 2011, 
http://witnessla.com/juvenile-justice/2011/admin/is-ventura-county-trying-kids-as-adults-mainly-
for-the-money/ (reporting on a possible financial incentive for the disproportionate number of 
transfers of younger juveniles to the adult system, despite evidence that crime rates did not 
decrease, and arguing that county prosecutors were passing on the costs of incarcerating 
juveniles to the state, regardless of whether transfer was warranted); see also Craig R. McCoy, 
Former Pa. Judge Gets 28 Years in ―Kids for Cash‖ Case, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 11, 
2011, http://articles.philly.com/2011-08-11/news/29876628_1_ciavarella-michael-t-conahan-
juvenile-court (reporting on corruption scandal in which juvenile court judges sentenced 
children to privately-run youth detention centers in exchange for kickbacks from the owner of 
the facilities).  
 230. See Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems‘ Responses to Youth 
Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 190, 199 (1998). 
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juveniles remaining in delinquency court who contest the charges 
must have a trial in which a judge, and not a jury, serves as the sole 
finder of fact.
231
 As a result, the perceptions and biases of these actors 
are another critical factor in determining whether children of low 
socioeconomic status are overrepresented in juvenile court.
232
 
Furthermore, as previous scholarship has demonstrated, attorneys 
representing juveniles are not immune to the negative attitudes 
towards low-income youth and their families.
233
 Whether they work 
for public defender offices or serve as appointed counsel, juvenile 
defenders are often underpaid and lack administrative support and 
litigation resources.
234
 They are also equally susceptible to the view 
that having a child adjudicated delinquent is the best way for a poor 
family to access needed services. As a result, defense attorneys may 
advise indigent youth to admit guilt and to waive their right to a trial, 
regardless of the weight of the state‘s evidence.235 Or they may argue 
for a punitive disposition that they believe is in their young client‘s 
―best interest,‖236 in direct opposition to the American Bar 
 
 231. See Szymanski, supra note 84, at 1; see also Birckhead, supra note 74, at 1451 n.20 
(discussing the jury trial right for juveniles and delineating the policies of various state juvenile 
codes). 
 232. See STERLING, supra note 78, at 5 (finding that juvenile court judges view zealous 
advocacy by defense attorneys as an ―impediment to the smooth function of the court,‖ as ―they 
consider juvenile court first and foremost an opportunity to ‗help a child‘‖); PATRICIA PURITZ, 
AM. BAR ASS‘N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 27 
(1995) (―In some courts, attorneys are subtly reminded by the court, the prosecutor, and other 
court personnel that zealous advocacy is considered inappropriate and counter-productive.‖). 
 233. See Birckhead, supra note 76, at 982; Graham & Lowery, supra note 227, at 502 
(―Although we chose to study police officers and probation officers in these studies, we are not 
singling out those decision makers as more prone to or vulnerable to unconscious racial bias. 
We could just as well have studied juvenile defense attorneys. . . .‖). 
 234. See, e.g., H. Ted Rubin, The Legal Defense of Juveniles: Struggling but Pushing 
Forward, JUV. JUST. UPDATE, June–July 2010, at 1 (reporting that more local resources are 
committed to juvenile prosecution than defense and that prosecutors are better paid and their 
offices better staffed).  
 235. See, e.g., NEBRASKA ASSESSMENT, supra note 213, at 36–37 (reporting that ―in most 
cases, the defense attorney would negotiate the plea agreement without talking to the client, 
discuss it with the client in the five minutes before the court hearing, and then walk into court 
and enter the plea‖); Birckhead, supra note 76, at 979. 
 236. See, e.g., PATRICIA PURITZ & ROBIN WALKER, NAT‘L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., 
JENNIFER RILEY-COLLINS & SHIELA A. BEDI, MISSISSIPPI YOUTH JUSTICE PROJECT, S. 
POVERTY LAW CNTR., MISSISSIPPI: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF 
REPRESENTATION IN YOUTH COURT PROCEEDINGS 42 (2007), http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ 
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Association and other practice standards that call for juvenile 
defenders to advocate for the child‘s ―expressed interest.‖237 In short, 
there are many ways in which a juvenile‘s own lawyer may 
contribute to the creation of a system in which children from low-
income homes do not need to be as ―guilty‖ as those from families of 
means in order to be found delinquent.
238
  
IV. RESULTING IMPACT ON YOUTH 
Research indicates that when children are processed through the 
juvenile court system and adjudicated delinquent, the impact is not 
benign—even when the disposition is arguably beneficial. Potential 
negative consequences of juvenile delinquency adjudications 
implicate such areas as housing, employment, immigration, and 
education as well as enhanced penalties for future offenses.
239
 
Further, longitudinal studies show that children exposed to juvenile 
court reoffend at higher rates and are stigmatized in the process.
240
 
Part IV argues that the system‘s overemphasis on the ―needs‖ of 
children results in high rates of recidivism and perpetuates harmful 
stereotypes based on class. 
A. Recidivism 
Researchers found that exposure to delinquency court negatively 
affects youth, particularly when detention or incarceration is 
imposed.
241
 Placing children in detention disrupts education, family 
 
mississippi_assessment.pdf (―I don‘t always listen to what [my juvenile clients] say . . . [m]ine 
is not the role of the typical defense attorney; I must consider what is best for the child, and I do 
not take the position that I must ‗get the child off at all costs.‘‖). 
 237. See Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and 
the Role of Child‘s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 257–59 
(2005) (stating that the expressed interest advocacy model has become the standard by which 
delinquency lawyers are judged). 
 238. See Birckhead, supra note 76, at 977–79, 981–82. 
 239. HERTZ, supra note 175, at 276–78; Michael Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical 
Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. 
L.J. 1111, 1114–18 (2006). 
 240. See infra notes 244–51 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Mark Soler, Missed Opportunity: Waiver, Race, Data, and Policy Reform, 71 LA. 
L. REV. 17, 25 (2010).  
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cohesion, and the provision of services.
242
 It exposes young people to 
the risk of physical and sexual assault as well as to psychological 
stress.
243
 Further, detention has been found to exacerbate the 
conditions of those with pre-existing behavioral or mental health 
problems, which includes a significant subgroup of youth who appear 
in juvenile court.
244
 Moreover, a substantial percentage of confined 
youth do not have histories of violence and pose ―minimal risk to 
public safety.‖245 Likewise, data suggests that reducing the rate of 
juvenile incarceration does not cause any increase in juvenile crime 
or violence.
246
  
Longitudinal studies demonstrate that arresting children and 
placing them in the juvenile justice system increases the likelihood of 
their continued involvement in the courts both as youth and as 
adults.
247
 For instance, a twenty-year study of seven hundred low-
income boys described as ―impulsive, poorly supervised by their 
parents, and exposed to deviant friends‖ was conducted in Montreal, 
Canada.
248
 The youths were charged with relatively minor crimes, 
including fighting, shoplifting, and possession of marijuana.
249
 The 
researchers found that the iatrogenic and criminogenic effects of 
juvenile court intervention were measured at a rate seven times higher 
than that of youths who were not subjected to police-initiated juvenile 
 
 242. See BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE 
DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER 
SECURE FACILITIES 2–3 (2006), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-11_REP_ 
DangersOfDetention_JJ.pdf; RICHARD A. MENDEL, NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR 
REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 2–3 (2011), http://www.aecf.org/OurWork/Juvenile 
Justice/~/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile%20Justice/Detention%20Reform/NoPlaceForKids/JDAI
_DeepEnd_Embargoed.pdf.  
 243. See, e.g., MENDEL, supra note 242, at 5–6; Soler, supra note 241, at 25.  
 244. See HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 242, at 8–9; MENDEL, supra note 242, at 12; 
Soler, supra note 241, at 25; see also Thomas Grisso, Adolescent Offenders with Mental 
Disorders, in 18 FUTURE OF CHILD.: JUV. JUST. 143, 144 (2008) (finding a ―heavy presence‖ of 
youth with mental disorders in the juvenile justice system, and suggesting that the most 
effective treatment methods are community-based).  
 245. MENDEL, supra note 242, at 13. 
 246. Id. at 9–12. 
 247. Id. at 10–12. 
 248. Uberto Gatti et al., Iatrogenic Effect of Juvenile Justice, J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHIATRY 991, 991–92 (2009). 
 249. Id. at 993. 
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court intervention.
250
 In other words, not only does ―mere 
intervention‖ by the juvenile justice system have a negative effect, 
but its impact increases as the intervention becomes ―more intense 
and constrictive.‖251 Another study, following thirteen hundred 
serious juvenile offenders ages fourteen through eighteen for seven 
years after conviction, was conducted in urban areas in Arizona and 
Pennsylvania.
252
 Based on multiple interviews and analyses of 
official records, researchers found that longer stays in juvenile 
institutions did not reduce recidivism and that even those youth with 
the lowest offending levels increased their levels of offending upon 
release from juvenile institutions.
253
 Such findings are consistently 
corroborated.
254
 
For youth in the juvenile justice system, the experience of being 
placed in detention is rapidly becoming the norm, not the 
exception.
255
 A recent survey by the federal Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention found that 28 percent of youth in 
juvenile delinquency court who are committed to out-of-home 
placements are ordered into detention.
256
 It is estimated that 
approximately five hundred thousand youth are brought to juvenile 
detention centers each year, and that on any given day, more than 
twenty-six thousand are detained.
257
 Despite findings such as those 
described above, sentences to detention facilities have become 
increasingly popular in juvenile court.
258
 Thirty-two states allow for 
 
 250. See Thurau, supra note 128, at 36; Gatti et al., supra note 248, at 996. 
 251. Gatti et al., supra note 248, at 996. 
 252. Edward P. Mulvey, Highlights from Pathways to Desistance: A Longitudinal Study of 
Serious Adolescent Offenders, Juvenile Justice Fact Sheet, OFF. JUV. JUST. DELINQUENCY 
PREV. 1, 2 (Mar. 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/230971.pdf. 
 253. Id. at 2. 
 254. See, e.g., HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 242, at 4–8 (citing studies confirming 
that detention can increase recidivism among youth, that alternatives to detention can curb 
crime and recidivism more effectively, and that there is little relationship between detention and 
overall crime in a community); MENDEL, supra note 242, at 10–12; Anthony Petrosino et al., 
Formal System Processing of Juveniles: Effects on Delinquency, CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC 
REVIEWS (2010), available at http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/761/ 
(finding in a comprehensive meta-analysis that juvenile system processing appears not to have a 
crime control effect and, in fact, appears to increase delinquency across all measures).  
 255. Sedlak & Bruce, supra note 89, at 6; HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 242, at 2. 
 256. Sedlak & Bruce, supra note 89, at 6. 
 257. HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 242, at 2–3. 
 258. Id. at 2; Sedlak & Bruce, supra note 89, at 6. 
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detention to be imposed as a disposition, and forty states use 
detention as a sanction for probation violations.
259
 Meanwhile, nearly 
70 percent of youth are detained for non-violent offenses.
260
 The data 
reveals that the risk of being taken into custody is ―significantly 
greater‖ for juveniles who live with a single parent or no parent than 
for juveniles living in two-parent households, a statistic that favors 
upper-income youth.
261
 It also indicates that the majority of 
incarcerated youth have been suspended from school during the 
previous year, almost half perform below grade level, and 30 percent 
have been diagnosed with a learning disability.
262
 Ironically, given 
the struggling U.S. economy, most states are spending ―vast sums‖ of 
taxpayer money and ―devoting the bulk‖ of their juvenile justice 
budgets to correctional institutions and out-of-home placements, 
despite the fact that ―non-residential programming options can 
deliver equal or better results for a fraction of the cost.‖263  
B. Stigma 
One of the original catalysts for the founding of a separate 
children‘s court in the 1890s was the notion that information about 
the juveniles as well as the proceedings themselves should be 
shielded from public view.
264
 This was premised on a desire to avoid 
stigmatizing young people for impulsive choices and indiscretions 
committed during childhood and adolescence.
265
 As a result, many 
juvenile court hearings and records were kept confidential.
266
 
Procedures were informal, and hearings were routinely held in the 
private chambers of the judge without witnesses, lawyers, or a written 
 
 259. See HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 242, at 2; Sedlak & Bruce, supra note 89, at 
6; 2006 Juvenile Justice Profiles, NAT‘L CTR. JUV. JUST. (2006), http://www.ncjj.org/Research 
_Resources/State_Profiles.aspx.  
 260. HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 242, at 2. 
 261. Sedlak & Bruce, supra note 89, at 6–7. 
 262. Id. at 7. 
 263. MENDEL, supra note 242, at 19. 
 264. See Tanenhaus, supra note 22, at 44, 61.  
 265. See id. 
 266. See id. at 61–65. 
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record.
267
 Most states had statutes that prohibited or placed 
restrictions on public proceedings and access to case files.
268
  
By the 1970s, perspectives changed. As juveniles‘ dispositions 
became more punitive, advocates called for openness in delinquency 
court, believing that public exposure would bring oversight and 
accountability.
269
 At the same time, court officials and politicians 
concerned about the advent of teen ―super predators‖ pushed for open 
hearings to ―stem the tide of juvenile crime.‖270 Through the 1980s 
and 1990s, increasing numbers of state and local jurisdictions re-
examined their juvenile court laws and policies relating to 
confidentiality.
271
 The trend toward more openness of juvenile court 
proceedings has continued into the twenty-first century, although the 
range of state laws on the issue remains broad.
272
  
Meanwhile, as discussed above, juvenile court involvement and 
intervention has been found to exacerbate the problems of youth.
273
 
This concern draws on the sociological literature on ―labeling 
theory,‖ the concept that attaching a label to a behavior creates 
further ―deviance.‖274 Once the label of ―juvenile delinquent‖ is 
formally imposed, it is readily accepted by both the child and the 
community, and the child is defined and perceived by others through 
the lens of this label.
275
 Community members, police officers, 
teachers, and potential employers then interact with and judge the 
child according to that description.
276
 In this way, children can be 
stigmatized by even the most minimal contact with the juvenile court 
system. 
 
 267. See id. at 64–65. 
 268. See Janet Mason, Confidentiality in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 1 JUV. L. 
BULL. 2 (2011). 
 269. Id. at 2–3. 
 270. Id. at 3. 
 271. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the 
Courtroom Doors be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 155 (1999). 
 272. Mason, supra note 268, at 3. 
 273. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 274. See Gatti, supra note 248, at 991, 996–97; Lee E. Teitelbaum, Juvenile Status 
Offenders, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUST. 983, 984–88 (1983). 
 275. See Gatti, supra note 248, at 996–97 (discussing the ―stigma attached to the [juvenile] 
justice system‖); Teitelbaum, supra note 274, at 984. 
 276. Teitelbaum, supra note 274, at 984. 
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V. STRATEGIES FOR REVERSING THE TREND 
Many of the strategies for addressing the overrepresentation of 
low-income children in delinquency court are modeled on those that 
have been developed for confronting the problem of disproportionate 
minority contact (DMC). This is explained, at least in part, by the fact 
that the two are related and often interwoven. There is value, 
however, in distinguishing between them and in addressing each 
separately, as they impact distinct populations: low-income children 
who are adjudicated delinquent come from all racial and ethnic 
groups, both majority and minority, just as racial and ethnic 
minorities processed in the juvenile justice system come from all 
socioeconomic groups. Part V examines several of the most effective 
means of reducing the pervasive problem of disparities in local 
juvenile courts, which apply to racial and ethnic minorities as well as 
to indigent youth. It also offers examples of international juvenile 
justice models that are preventative and diversionary rather than 
penal and punitive. 
A. Data Collection and Raising Awareness 
Few juvenile court systems collect data on the income levels of 
children and their families as they are processed through the system. 
Although some entities, such as public defender offices and probation 
departments, may gather this information at discrete stages of the 
process, they do not typically share it with other institutional actors. 
Moreover, jurisdictions in which counsel is provided without regard 
to income are not likely to maintain any documentation related to the 
juvenile‘s class status. Yet, reliable data is critical for accurate 
analysis of the problem and for development of solutions to reduce 
income disparities.
277
 Modeled on efforts to reduce DMC, states 
could gather income data at critical processing points in the system, 
such as arrest, intake, appointment of counsel, adjudication, and 
 
 277. See JEFF ARMOUR & SARAH HAMMOND, NAT‘L CONF. STATE LEGISLATORS, 
MINORITY YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT 
8 (2009), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/minoritiesinjj.pdf.  
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disposition.
278
 An advisory body could then determine where income 
disparities exist, identify instances of unnecessary juvenile justice 
system involvement, and monitor implementation of reforms to 
address the issue.
279
  
Awareness of the problem is another critical aspect of reducing 
individual and institutional biases, with perhaps the best model again 
found in the movement to reduce DMC.
280
 Various national 
initiatives exist to raise awareness of DMC among judges, 
prosecutors, and agency personnel as well as community leaders, 
educators, and parents, with admittedly mixed success.
281
 The 
MacArthur Foundation‘s Models for Change initiative, established in 
2004, is one of the best organized and well-funded.
282
 It aims to 
achieve racial fairness in the juvenile justice system by emphasizing 
local reforms that can be expanded statewide, such as increasing the 
language abilities and cultural diversity of agency personnel who 
serve juveniles and their families.
283
 Another is the Juvenile 
Detention Alternatives Initiative, launched in 1992 by the Annie E. 
Casey Foundation, which works to reduce DMC by focusing on 
pretrial detention, a ―critical processing point‖ within the delinquency 
system.
284
 Similarly, the W. Haywood Burns Institute targets local 
sites to ensure that neighborhood representatives directly supervise 
DMC reduction within their own communities; the Institute has 
successfully worked in over thirty jurisdictions.
285
 In addition, several 
 
 278. Id.; Emily R. Cabaniss et al., Reducing Disproportionate Minority Contact in the 
Juvenile Justice System: Promising Practices, 12 AGGRESSIVE & VIOLENT BEHAV. 393, 399–
400 (2007). 
 279. ARMOUR & HAMMOND, supra note 277, at 8. 
 280. Id. at 9. 
 281. See BELL ET AL., supra note 9, at 11–16 (discussing failed federal efforts to reduce 
DMC, and calling for federal legislation to be strengthened to provide necessary guidance to 
states and localities in their efforts to reduce disparities in the juvenile justice system). 
 282. Racial and Ethnic Fairness/DMC, MODELS FOR CHANGE: SYSTEMS REFORM IN 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/Issues-for-change/Racial-fairness 
.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2011); ARMOUR & HAMMOND, supra note 277, at 5.  
 283. ARMOUR & HAMMOND, supra note 277, at 5. 
 284. Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative, THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., http://www. 
aecf.org/majorinitiatives/juveniledetentionalternativesinitiative.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2011); 
ARMOUR & HAMMOND, supra note 277, at 6. 
 285. THE W. HAYWOOD BURNS INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE FAIRNESS AND EQUITY: 
OUR WORK, http://www.burnsinstitute.org/article.php?id=56 (last visited Oct. 26, 2011); 
ARMOUR & HAMMOND, supra note 277, at 7. 
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states have enacted formal policies that prescribe methods for curbing 
DMC, including Connecticut, Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, 
South Dakota, and Washington.
286
 
B. Diversion and Collaborative Mental Health Treatment 
A further strategy for confronting and reversing needs-based 
delinquency is for law enforcement agencies and schools to take steps 
to avoid indiscriminately directing low-income minor offenders into 
the juvenile justice system.
287
 Between 1985 and 2008, the number of 
adjudicated cases that resulted in court-ordered probation increased 
by 67 percent, while those that were resolved by informal probation 
decreased 13 percent.
288
 The trend toward more formal processing of 
delinquency cases flies in the face of evidence that diversion 
programs can be extraordinarily effective. For instance, such 
programs have been shown to develop accountability among young 
offenders, keep less serious offenders from moving deeper into the 
system, and reduce the workload and costs of police departments and 
courts.
289
 At a time when states are dramatically reducing the budgets 
of juvenile justice agencies, fewer court referrals would also help 
offset cuts.
290
 In response to such data, at least one state has amended 
its juvenile diversion law to mandate that prior to filing a delinquency 
petition, the police officer or prosecutor must ―identify why juvenile 
court diversion was not an appropriate disposition.‖291 Similarly, a 
variety of diversion programs—including teen courts, mediation, 
victim restitution, and restorative justice—have been created for first-
time offenders, and could be replicated across the United States to 
help keep low-income youth out of delinquency court.
292
 
A related strategy has been recommended in the context of mental 
health treatment. As discussed earlier, adolescent offenders with 
 
 286. ARMOUR & HAMMOND, supra note 277, at 7. 
 287. Rubin, supra note 10, at 6.  
 288. Livsey, supra note 4, at 2. 
 289. FED. ADVISORY COMM. JUV. JUSTICE, supra note 79, at 20. 
 290. Id. (finding that diversion programs are cost effective); Rubin, supra note 10, at 6. 
 291. Rubin, supra note 10, at 7–8 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:10) (emphasis 
added). 
 292. Id. at 8; FEDERAL ADVISORY COMM. JUV. JUSTICE, supra note 79, at 19–20. 
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psychological and behavioral disorders—many of whom are low-
income—comprise a ―significant subgroup‖ of youth in the juvenile 
justice system.
293
 Thomas Grisso suggests that rather than place 
greater emphasis on providing mental health treatment for this 
population within the juvenile court system, a network of services 
could be created that cuts across public child welfare agency 
boundaries.
294
 Through the establishment of ―community systems of 
care,‖ services could be coordinated among mental health, child 
protection, education, and juvenile justice agencies.
295
 This approach 
would improve cross-agency referrals and collaboration, encourage 
cost-sharing, and reduce the ―conflict, inefficiency, and frustration‖ 
that families typically experience when services are provided by 
several different agencies.
296
 As a result, mentally ill low-income 
youth would no longer need to be adjudicated delinquent and 
institutionalized in order to receive appropriate treatment.
297
 Instead, 
they would be treated while living at home with their families, a 
strategy shown to be more effective than treatment programs outside 
the community.
298
 Such systems of care would enable the 
delinquency system to play a more focused and limited role: mental 
health services would be necessary only for juveniles already in 
secure custody and for a smaller percentage that could not be safely 
treated in the community.
299
  
C. International Care and Protection Models 
On the international level, there are significant differences among 
juvenile justice systems. Like the United States, the majority of 
English-speaking countries use traditional punitive methods of 
reducing juvenile crime.
300
 However, several countries in Europe and 
 
 293. See infra notes 300–06 and accompanying text. 
 294. Grisso, supra note 244, at 154–55.  
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 154 (―[Y]outh must carry the burden of a delinquency record to get basic mental 
health services, and that burden increases the likelihood of their future delinquency, criminal 
behavior, and arrest as adults.‖). 
 298. Id. at 153. 
 299. Id. at 155, 157. 
 300. See PETER MURPHY ET AL., REVIEW OF EFFECTIVE PRACTICE IN JUVENILE JUSTICE: 
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elsewhere have demonstrated that combining preventative programs 
with therapeutic services offers the most effective model for keeping 
all but the most serious young offenders out of the juvenile justice 
systems.
301
 Successful approaches utilize home, school, and 
community-based therapies to reduce risk factors, such as family 
dysfunction, delinquent peer groups, truancy, and alcohol and drug 
abuse, while strengthening protective factors, including parenting 
skills, mentors and role models, and positive extra-curricular 
activities.
302
 Promising models are found in the youth justice systems 
of Scotland,
303
 Italy,
304
 and Scandinavia.
305
 Although each of these 
countries operates under a slightly different framework, they all 
recognize that children in trouble—whether the result of ―deeds or 
needs‖—are fundamentally similar; that institutional divisions and 
legal distinctions between the two groups are not meaningful; and 
that offending is often ―symptomatic of deeper psychological or 
social malaise.‖306  
Scotland, for instance, utilizes an informal process called 
―Children‘s Hearing Systems‖ that are managed by ―panels‖ of 
trained volunteers from the local community.
307
 Operating like a 
welfare tribunal, each panel is composed of three lay leaders (aged 
 
REPORT FOR THE MINISTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (2010), http://www.djj.nsw.gov.au/pdf_ 
htm/publications/general/Juvenile%20Justice%20Effective%20Practice%20Review%20FINAL
.pdf.  
 301. Id. at 3–4. 
 302. Id. at IV. 
 303. Id. at 5–6. 
 304. See Vincenzo Scalia, A Lesson in Tolerance? Juvenile Justice in Italy, 5 YOUTH 
JUSTICE 33, 41 (2005) (describing Italy‘s juvenile justice system as one characterized by 
―diversion, decriminalization, and decarceration,‖ and stating that its culture of ―refusal of 
punishment‖ depends less on the offenses committed than on professional forensic evaluations 
of the offenders); see also David Nelken, Italian Juvenile Justice: Tolerance, Leniency, or 
Indulgence?, 6 YOUTH JUSTICE 107, 108–20 (2006) (finding that the Italian juvenile justice 
system is relatively lenient compared with many others, but cautions against drawing too many 
lessons from Italian practice). 
 305. See MURPHY ET AL., supra note 300, at 7–8 (describing the system found in 
Scandinavian countries, where the age of criminal responsibility starts at fifteen, the rate of 
youth incarceration is very low, and the approach to juvenile justice involves systematic 
collaboration among schools, local social welfare agencies, and police). 
 306. See id. at 5–6 (discussing Scotland), 7–8 (discussing Scandinavia); Nelken, supra note 
304, at 109–10 (discussing Italy, Scotland, and Scandinavia).  
 307. See Michele Burman et al., The End of an Era?—Youth Justice in Scotland, in 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 439, 441–42 (J. Junger-Tas et al. eds., 2008). 
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eighteen to sixty) and a professional ―reporter‖ with a social work or 
legal background.
308
 The parent or child, who is between ages eight 
and eighteen, can bring a representative to the hearing, such as a 
friend, family member, or legal adviser.
309
 The Scottish system, 
which includes over two thousand panel members, separates the 
function of examining the child‘s needs from the establishment of 
guilt.
310
 Panels may order supervision in the community as well as 
out-of-home placement in schools, residential care, or secure 
facilities.
311
 As a result, a much lower number of children are 
incarcerated in Scotland than in the jurisdictions of England and 
Wales, which have similar demographics and social problems.
312
 The 
number of children referred to the Hearings System has increased 
dramatically in recent years, with the vast majority referred on 
grounds of care and protection rather than for alleged offenses.
313
 It is 
estimated that Scotland prosecutes just 0.5 percent of young people 
under sixteen who have committed an offense.
314
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Walk into almost any delinquency courtroom in the United States, 
and you will find that the vast majority of children in the system are 
living at or below the poverty level.
315
 One or both of their parents 
are unemployed. If their family members have jobs, they earn 
minimum wage. Their homes are in low-income neighborhoods. 
There are no book stores, libraries, or playgrounds within walking 
distance. They qualify for food stamps. They attend low performing 
public schools. They are chronically absent or have developmental 
delays, learning disorders, or mental illnesses. They have minimal 
health care coverage and rely on visits to the emergency room for 
routine treatment. They are sad, angry, or completely lack affect.  
 
 308. Id. at 442. 
 309. Id.  
 310. Id.  
 311. Id. at 443. 
 312. Id. at 439; MURPHY ET AL., supra note 300, at 6.  
 313. Burman et al., supra note 307, at 450–53. 
 314. Id. at 458. 
 315. See THE 2011 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES, http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/11poverty 
.shtml (indicating that a family of four earning less than $22,350 is living in poverty). 
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If you spend enough time in these courtrooms, you begin to ask 
why. Why is it that poor children are arrested, charged, and 
prosecuted at higher rates than children of means? Why are fewer 
poor children diverted from the system than wealthy children? Why 
does the standard of proof seem to depend on the socioeconomic 
level of the child‘s family? Why do so many poor children violate the 
terms and conditions of their probation? Why are so few middle- and 
upper-class children sent to detention?  
This Article has begun the project of attempting to answer some 
of these questions. As with the legacy of DMC, it is ―considerably 
easier for system stakeholders to blame youth than to do the hard 
work of examining and transforming the practices and policies that 
may be contributing to disparities.‖316 Law makers and politicians 
argue that the current budget crisis forecloses any possibility for 
reform. Yet, the claim that juvenile court involvement is the only 
viable avenue for many low-income families to access needed 
services is no longer acceptable. Given the negative impact that 
juvenile court processing has on youth and their families, 
adjudicating children delinquent by reason of poverty is an inherently 
unfair method. Marcus,
317
 like all our children, deserve better.  
 
 316. BELL ET AL., supra note 9, at 15. 
 317. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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